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Tarkastelen tutkielmassani pahuuden käsitettä kristillisen teologian ja kantilaisen filosofian
näkökulmasta. Analysoin John Miltonin teoksia A Maske presented at Ludlow Castle, 1634 ja
Paradise Regained.
A Maske presented at Ludlow Castle, 1634 on naamionäytelmä, joka esitettiin ensimmäistä kertaa
vuonna 1634 Bridgewaterin jaarlin perhepiirissä. Jaarli oli myös tilannut näytelmän. Juoni kertoo
kolmesta lapsesta (kaksi veljestä ja heidän siskonsa), jotka ovat matkalla vanhempiensa luo synkän
metsän halki. Lady joutuu Comus-nimisen velhon vangitsemaksi ja veljet pelastavat hänet taivaasta
lähetetyn varjelijan (Attendant Spirit) ja vedenneito Sabrinan avustuksella.
Paradise Regained on jatkoa Miltonin eepokselle Paradise Lost (suom. Kadotettu paratiisi). Se
kertoo Raamatun tarinan, jossa Jeesus viettää 40 päivää autiomaassa, jonne Saatana tulee häntä
koettelemaan. Molempien teosten keskiössä on vastustajien suorittama viettely (temptation)
retoriikan keinoin. Molemmissa teoksissa sankarit selviävät koettelemuksistaan
vahingoittumattomina vedoten totuuteen ja Jumalan varjelukseen.
Perehdyn ensin kristilliseen teologiaan ja etenkin vapaan tahdon kysymykseen. Käytän lähteinäni
Miltonin proosatuotantoa sekä kirjallisuudentutkimusta Miltonin töistä. Syvennän käyttämääni
teoriapohjaa tiivistämällä Immanuel Kantin moraalifilosofian keskeisiä ajatuksia pahuudesta. Nämä
kaksi teoreettista lähestymistapaa ovat hyvin lähellä toisiaan ja käytänkin niille yhteisiä
konstruktioita hyväkseni. Näitä konstruktioita ovat vapaa tahto, pahat teot, ja perisynti. Kantin
mukaan ihmisillä on aina taipumus valita paha maksimi jossain vaiheessa elämäänsä. Tämä
taipumus johtuu itsesuojeluvaistosta, joka pakottaa ihmiset puntaroimaan asioita oman
hyvinvointinsa näkökulmasta.
Tutkielmassani pyrin todistamaan, ettei ketään teosten hahmoista voi kutsua puhtaasti pahaksi, vaan
pahuuden nimitystä voi ainoastaan käyttää viitatessa tekoihin. Hyvien hahmojen kohdalla pyrin
osoittamaan, kuinka vaikeaa on tehdä oikea valinta, ja että nämäkin hahmot joutuvat puntaroimaan
valintojaan itsesuojeluvaiston kautta.
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11 Introduction
What is ‘evil’? The easiest way to answer this question is to quote Oxford English Dictionary on the
meaning of the word:
The antithesis of good adj., adv., and n. in all its principal senses. In Old English, as in
all the other early Germanic langs. exc. Scandinavian, this word is the most
comprehensive adjectival expression of disapproval, dislike, or disparagement. In mod.
colloquial English it is little used, such currency as it has being due to literary influence.
In quite familiar speech the adj. is commonly superseded by bad; the n. is somewhat
more frequent, but chiefly in the widest senses, the more specific senses being
expressed by other words, as harm, injury, misfortune, disease, etc. (OED Online)
In my thesis I will mainly use the term as referring to something extremely unpleasant – the usual
modern way of using the word ‘evil’. I try not to make qualitative distinctions on the unpleasantness
of a certain phenomenon or act because of consistency in my analysis, so I will refrain from making
a distinction between ‘bad’ and ‘evil’. This is a conscious decision, and based on the fact that
making that distinction is purely subjective: all human beings have their own boundaries on the
matter. I would not feel comfortable to rely on a subjective scale. I will clarify my view on evil in
the course of this thesis and attempt to be as objective as possible relying on Kantian rigorism.
The existence of evil has perplexed thinkers throughout history. Religion and philosophy
have tried to solve the problem of evil in multiple theories about origins. “From its inception,
Christianity was deeply concerned with questions of evil. This concern crystallized in two questions
that have remained central to the Christian tradition. Where did evil come from, and what can be
done about it?” (Gillespie 2006, 30). Christianity has produced different views on the matter
ranging from the Manichean view of God being both good and evil to Augustinian view of evil as
nothingness, a lack of the good. This need to explain evil results from the fundamental problem
Christianity has with the very concept of evil: how can there be evil in the world created by a good,
all-powerful God? But not only Christianity has struggled with evil and its existence. Philosophers
have also tried to explain evil in different ways, ranging from Aristotle’s view of evil as failing to
fulfill the purpose of human nature to Nietzsche’s nihilism. I will not examine different views on
evil very thoroughly in my thesis, as I will be focusing on Christianity and Kantian philosophy. I
2will mainly utilize these two views on evil in my interpretation of two texts by John Milton, A
Masque and Paradise Regained. I will also examine how closely related Kantian philosophy and
Christianity are, if at all, in the regard of the question: what can be considered as evil?
As for the originality of my pursuit; I am well aware of the fact that Milton studies is a very
large field of academic work and I do not claim to have any completely original ideas and
interpretations on my chosen subject, but I do believe that my thesis is not altogether pure repetition
of old ideas either. The subject of evil in Milton is indeed very thoroughly studied, but, as of yet, I
have not found works that combine Christian and Kantian views on evil to the extent I do. Dennis
Danielson utilizes Christian theology in his study of Milton in his outstanding book Milton’s Good
God, and I have used his work as a starting point with the Christian part of my thesis. Danielson
goes very thoroughly through Christian theology focusing on the Free Will Defense and utilizes it to
interpret Milton’s work. I would also like to mention C.A. Patrides and his extensive look into the
matter of Christian heroism in Milton and the Christian Tradition. He has a firm Christian approach
to Milton and refreshingly does not solely focus on Paradise Lost. A lot of Milton studies have
focused on Paradise Lost as is expected; it is an epic and has many nuances to study. Among others,
Stanley Fish1 and Neil Forsyth (The Satanic Epic) have written excellent books on the matter of sin
in Paradise Lost. Historically speaking, there was a long debate between Satanists and anti-
Satanists on whether or not Milton wanted the reader to emphasize the heroism of Satan or
Christian mores in Paradise Lost. Famously the Romantics were on the Satanist side of the
argument along with A.J.A Waldcock and William Empson (Carey 1999, 161). The opposing side of
anti-Satanists has been represented by Stanley Fish, C. S. Lewis and Charles Williams (Carey 1999,
161). Luckily criticism has moved on from this narrow division and we have a much more rich field
of research, such as Nancy Rosenfeld with her account of the character of Satan in literary history
and Claire Colebrook with her excursion to the subject of evil. Even though the subjects of these
1 Stanley Fish, Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost, 1967, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. I am not
using Fish in this thesis because his work is focused on Paradise Lost so thoroughly that I found it impossible to use
his otherwise excellent book as a source in my work on Paradise Regained and A Masque.
3two books suggest that the two critics are only occupied with Satan and might be thus erroneously
labeled as Satanist, they are not. Both of them study the character of Satan without downplaying the
protagonists of Milton’s works nor do they raise the character of Satan on a pedestal, like some of
the previous critics have done. I will try to follow the example set by Rosenfeld and Colebrook and
read Milton’s protagonists and antagonists as equally necessary characters for the texts I use. As for
the Kantian side of my thesis, I use Kant’s texts as well as articles by different scholars to clarify the
philosophical issues relevant for my thesis. Milton and Kant have been extensively paired together
by Sandford Budick in Kant and Milton, but he focuses on Kant and writes about how Kant used
Milton as an example. Claire Colebrook’s book Milton, Evil and Literary History uses Kantian
philosophy among others to analyze Milton’s works. She draws some parallels between the two, but
does it in a way that does not focus on any single text but looks at Milton’s career as a whole. Her
work is indeed groundbreaking as she does not adhere only to the traditional Christian reading, but
finds novel ways to examine the legacy of Milton. But even though Colebrook uses Kantian
philosophy extensively, she does not analyze the particular texts I use very thoroughly. This is
where my thesis may be of use in the field of Milton studies. I intend to do as comprehensive
analysis as is possible within the confines of a Master’s thesis of these two works and place them in
the frame of the choice between good and evil.
I intend to examine the evil represented in the two texts mainly by analyzing the characters
and the choices they make. My analysis will focus on the main characters of Comus and the Lady in
A Masque, and the Son and Satan in Paradise Regained, although I will mention some of the other
characters as well. I have chosen these works by Milton in order to avoid Paradise Lost, because it
is nearly impossible to be original when burdened with such huge amounts of literary criticism and
a lot of it concerning evil in the epic. However, I will not completely ignore Paradise Lost, since the
topic of the epic does relate to the topics of A Masque and Paradise Regained. The two texts I have
chosen do bear some similarities, such as that they are both temptation-narratives (Rosenfeld 2008,
81-82). I intend to explore this and other similarities in the two texts in order to create a coherent
4analysis of evil in these works. I would also like to mention that because the two texts were written
in completely different stages of Milton’s career, some development in Milton’s views might be
present.
I am intrigued by the way Milton mixes the two apparent opposites of good and evil and this
is the main reason for my choice of topic and, in this thesis, I will be mainly concerning myself with
the questions about whether or not the characters are to be viewed as either good or evil. I will not
limit my analysis with using only Christian theology on the seemingly one-dimensional nature of
some characters, such as the Son and Satan, because they are not to be viewed solely through their
Christian counterparts. Even though they are obviously based on the Christian figures, they are still
characters in a poem. Milton presents the reader with his own version of the story from the Gospels
where Jesus is tempted by Satan in the wilderness (Luke 4:1-14). The characters I am dealing with
are Milton’s creations and as such not the biblical ones. “A poetic character is created in the human
imagination; the figures that emerge therefrom cannot be any less human and fallible than their
creators” (Bryson 2002, 89-90). Literary criticism is after all mainly an interpretation of a text
through the critic’s ideology, and in the case of Paradise Regained and Paradise Lost, a sort of a
double interpretation, as the critic interprets Milton’s interpretation of the Bible (Danielson 1982,
20). Milton’s depiction of the characters is in itself controversial “because so many people still
believe in, or worry about, the actual existence of his most important ones: Adam, Eve, Satan,
Jesus” (Danielson 1999, 144). Even though Milton wrote about the struggle between good and evil,
are there such things as completely evil beings? And how does intention affect how an act is judged
morally? Are moral choices easy to make? Are we even able to determine anything concrete about
evil?
As the reason for utilizing Christian doctrine to interpret Milton is a fairly obvious one – him
being extremely set on his task to “justify the ways of God to men” (Paradise Lost, I.26)2 by
writing two epic poems with topics taken straight from the Bible and producing a long account of
2 From here on Paradise Lost will be referred to as PL. I am using the second edition of Paradise Lost, originally
published in 1674.
5his personal view on Christianity (Christian Doctrine)3 – my choice of using Kantian philosophy to
widen the scope of my analysis needs clarification. After all, Milton died in 1674 and Kant was
born 50 years later. It might seem odd to use one theory that was present at the time of Milton’s life
and another that was developed long after he passed away. I have chosen Kant because of his
philosophy’s overlap with Christianity. I also do not want to rely solely on Christian theology
because I want to create a more vibrant picture of the characters than would be possible if I would
only use theology. There is also the fact to which I hinted earlier: Christianity has been used
extensively in previous Milton studies, but Kant’s philosophy has not been utilized as much in the
study of Milton’s work. My endeavor is not a random choice; there are similarities between the two
theoretical frameworks which I will point out in the thesis. There is also the issue that the Kantian
definition of evil is relatively close to Milton’s view of evil. As Claire Colebrook (2008, 64) notes:
“[o]ne of Milton’s achievements in Paradise Lost is to combine the earlier Augustinian sense of evil
as privation or non-being – falling away from the good rather than a positive existence – with the
modern Kantian conception of evil as an act of the will that freely decides to will.” There is also the
matter that Kant himself appreciated Milton and his work very much: “Kant’s Miltonic aesthetics
and Miltonic moral reason, firmly linked to his direct comments on Milton, constitute the most
penetrating account ever written of the inner workings, and the inner impact on the reader, of
Milton’s poetry” (Budick 2010, 4).
The first text I will deal with in this thesis is John Milton’s A Masque, a masque first
performed in 1634. The original name given by Milton to the masque is A Maske presented at
Ludlow Castle, 1634, but I will refer to it as A Masque in order to save time and space. The spelling
I use is taken from the printed version I use. I will not be referring to the masque as Comus even
3 De Doctrina Christiana (Christian Doctrine) was first published in 1823, which is 149 years after Milton died. This
date might seem odd, but the manuscript was found in the State Papers Office in 1823 and only then was it
published. Christian Doctrine contains heretical opinions, such as Milton’s clear anti-trinitarian view of God, and
this might be the reason for it not getting published after Milton’s death. That might also explain why some critics
have claimed that this could not be Milton’s writing and why it became a very controversial issue. In 1996 a report
produced by a committee assembled to investigate the matter titled ‘The Provenance of De Doctrina Christiana’
came out stating that the majority of it is Milton’s work, but that he could not have worked alone. This is hardly
surprising, as the poet became completely blind at roughly the same time he began the work on Christian Doctrine.
For more discussion see Dobranski 1999, 20-21 and Bradford 2001, 43-45.
6though many of my sources do, because “calling Comus ‘Comus’ may be tantamount to calling
Paradise Lost ‘Satan’” and “[m]odern editors and critics would rather call the masque A Mask”
(Flannagan 1989, 21). The general audience and previous literary criticism refer to the masque as
Comus even if I do not. This will become clear when I quote some of the earlier work done on the
masque. On Michaelmas night 1634 A Masque was performed for the Earl of Bridgewater, who had
also commissioned the masque. The Earl’s children – John, Thomas, and Alice Egerton – performed
the parts of the children in the masque. A Masque tells the story of the three children, who are on
their way through a menacing forest to see their parents. The Lady gets separated from her brothers
in the woods and is deceived and captured by the sorcerer Comus. He tries to tempt her into
drinking a potion that would turn her into a monster but with the help of her own reason, the
Attendant Spirit sent from Heaven, and the goddess Sabrina, the Lady is eventually saved.
The second text I have chosen for this thesis is John Milton’s Paradise Regained. It was
published in 1671 together with Samson Agonistes. It is often referred to as a brief epic since it only
has four relatively short books compared to his “proper” epic, Paradise Lost. The story is of the
temptation of Christ found in the gospels of Matthew and Luke. He spends forty days in the desert
and is visited by Satan who tries to tempt the Son to bow down to him. Jesus refuses to be fooled by
Satan, and finally Satan is conquered. But as Mary Ann Radzinowicz (1999, 202) notes, the gospels
were not the only biblical influence on Paradise Regained, which is “a debate poem like Job, with a
plot taken from Luke, expounding an interpretation of Christ’s redemptive work drawn from
Hebrews, framed by angelic hymns, and foregrounded by human laments modeled on Psalms.” I
will now turn my attention to the manner in which Christianity has attempted to explain evil in a
world created by a benevolent God and return to these biblical allusions later.
72 Christian Theology and Evil
According to Danielson (1999, 144):
The so-called theological problem of evil . . . can itself be seen as a problem concerning
how to balance three fundamental propositions to which virtually all Christians, and
perhaps others, assent:
1 God is all powerful (or omnipotent).
2 God is wholly good.
3 There is evil in the world.
Christianity has, among other explanations, developed the ideas of personified evil, Satan, and free
will in general to try and explain how there could be evil in the world created by a good God.
Cabrera (2001, 19) lists some ways of trying to explain suffering, which she sees as basically
synonymously with evil, from a Christian standpoint: “to show that this suffering is justified,
believers defend (and occasionally combine) the following four answers: (1) suffering is a
punishment; (2) suffering is a test or trial; (3) suffering is the prelude to eternal life; or (4) suffering
is a mystery.” She discusses the problems associated with these answers, and fails to give a single
complete answer to the problem. The problem with suffering as punishment arises from the guilt of
the person suffering: “[t]o think that suffering is a punishment is to suppose that any afflicted
person is guilty – even a newborn – and we cannot accept that this should be so” (Cabrera 2001,
20). Of course we can claim that all human beings are guilty, but it does not seem to justify the
suffering of a baby. The second answer is used to get rid of some unsolved cases of suffering that
are not deserved (Cabrera 2001, 20). Job is a famous example of this, but there is a problem with
this explanation as well: what about those who die as God is supposedly testing them (Cabrera
2001, 20-21)? The third explanation is used for just this purpose. If a person has led a good
Christian life, he will be rewarded with eternal life in heaven (Cabrera, 21). The last point is the
most interesting one. It includes the basic “God works in mysterious ways” reasoning, but also tries
to explain how God has the universe in mind and suffering is sometimes good in a universal scale
(Cabrera 2001, 21). But this mystery-explanation seems to be one that covers just about everything
and makes discussion about the problem futile:
8God knows why he does things, although for us this remains a mystery. God acts
knowingly and freely, but his reason and his will are unfathomable mysteries. Pointing
out this possibility leaves us just as we were: without understanding and without being
able to help thinking that the suffering we undergo, and for which we as a species are
not responsible, is a senseless evil that appears entirely gratuitous. (Cabrera 2001, 21)
There have also been different explanations according to what kind of evil is being
discussed. As Danielson (1982, 3) notes: “[t]raditionally, three kinds of evil have been
distinguished: ‘metaphysical,’ natural, and moral.” Danielson (1982, 5) defines metaphysical evil as
less good than the supreme good, God, thus it is not actual evil, it is just “the essential dependency,
finitude, imperfection, and limitation of all created things.” This view on evil arises from the belief
that God created everything out of nothing and thus the created beings are in some way flawed from
the beginning (creatio ex nihilo). It has been most prominently supported (or even created) by Saint
Augustine: “[i]t will then be found that the evil choice takes its origin not from the fact that the man
is a natural being, but from the fact that his natural being is created from nothing” (City of God,
XII.6). The idea of evil as nothingness is still defended when speaking about metaphysical evil
because no one has provided a better theory: “the definition of evil as absence, which the Middle
Ages inherited from Augustine, seems inadequate to express anything about contemporary horror,
no other metaphysical definitions have been – perhaps mercifully – proposed” (Neiman 2001, 29).
Metaphysical evil is dependent on the material itself of which human beings are created and is not a
suitable explanation when talking about genocide for example. It seems like a catastrophically
inadequate reason for murdering millions of people for their race alone. What about the other types
of evil? Natural evil, on the other hand, is the evil that exists in the world without someone causing
it, such as natural disasters, and moral evil is something caused by a person’s rational and free
choice (Danielson 1982, 3-4). Natural evil is something that is present in our world, but we cannot
really control it. We can only try to adjust after a hurricane has destroyed New Orleans or an
earthquake shakes Japan. This type of evil has been traditionally said to be caused by divine wrath
upon people, but after the developments in science, we can now somewhat understand the
mechanics behind these incidents. Finally we come to moral evil, which is my main focus in this
9thesis. Moral evil stems from an act a person does willingly which is considered as immoral. We
have different moral values we want to uphold and morality is in a lot of ways subjective. But there
are mutually agreed principles that form laws in our societies. This common ground includes among
others property crimes, murder, assault, and slander. There have to be some common rules for a
society to function. There also has to be some way of evaluating these according to their severity in
order to punish the people committing these crimes and this is where the justice systems around the
world come in. The people working in the justice system have the horrible task of deciding what is
a crime, who is a criminal, and how they should be punished. I will not go further into the
discussion on law and moral judgment, but move on to the actual matter at hand: what is seen as
evil from a Christian point of view.
2.1 Sin
Sin is basically a morally evil act in Christian terminology. Sin is caused by a rational being
exercising his or her free will and is defined by Milton (Christian Doctrine, 382)4 as breaking the
law, law meaning “primarily that law which is innate and implanted in man’s mind; and secondly it
means the law which is proceeded from the mouth of God.” C. A. Patrides (1966, 85-86) quotes a
passage from Paradise Regained during his lengthy discussion about the natural law, or Milton’s
innate law:
he who receives
Light from above, from the fountain of light,
No other doctrine needs, though granted true;
But these are false, or little else but dreams,
Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm. (Paradise Regained, IV.288-292)5
The passage is part of the Son’s retort to Satan concerning Greek philosophy. Jesus claims that the
knowledge from God is true and the knowledge of the ancient philosophers was “built on nothing
firm,” although occasionally correct. Patrides (1966, 86) claims that
Here is no self-righteous assertion that Christians will inevitably conduct themselves in a
4 From here on Christian Doctrine will be referred to as CD.
5 From here on Paradise Regained will be referred to as PR
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morally upright manner, but the expectation that they are more capable of attaining the highest
standards of morality because their moral code comes . . . from God while that of the others is
merely ‘natural’ . . . and so subject to error.
Patrides (1966, 85) argues that the written law, i.e. the law coming from the mouth of God, is indeed
more important than the natural law. Natural law is the law that resides within our conscience and
does not necessarily have to be written down, or our own internal moral scale by which we deem
things as either moral or immoral. The written law means the commandments God gave Moses or to
Adam and Eve in Paradise. Milton (CD, 352) seems to agree with Patrides’s point about the written
law being more important than the natural law, at least when it comes to the matter of original sin:
God forbade Adam and Eve to eat from a single tree, an act “which was in itself neither good nor
evil” to test which law they would place above the other. They chose to listen to their internal,
natural law instead of God’s commandment. Obviously this choice was not the one that was hoped
for by God. Even though Milton might agree with Patrides, he (Reason of Church-Government,
764) does note that we need both to be moral: “That which is thus morall, besides what we fetch
from those unwritten lawes and Ideas which nature hath ingraven in us, the Gospell, as stands with
her dignity most, lectures to us from her own authentick hand-writing, and command.” Leading a
morally good life requires both; listening to your conscience and seeking guidance from the Bible.
The Christian concept of original sin is another matter in the discussion of sin in general.
“And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely
eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that
thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die” (Gen. 2:16-17).6 The recently created Adam and Eve
eventually chose to eat from the tree even though God specifically told them not to, and with them
the whole of the human race fell. This tree became known as “the tree of knowledge of good and
evil because of what happened afterwards: for since it was tasted, not only do we know evil, but
also we do not even know good except through evil” (CD, 352). Milton seems to think that this is
an important point, as Christian Doctrine is not the only text where this matter is discussed:
6 All of the quotations from the Bible are from the King James Version.
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Good and evill we know in the field of this World grow up together almost inseparably;
and the knowledge of good is so involv’d and interwoven with the knowledge of evill,
and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be discern’d, that those confused seeds
which were impos’d on Psyche as an incessant labour to cull out, and sort asunder, were
not more intermixt. It was from out the rinde of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of
good and evill as two twins cleaving together leapt forth into the World. And perhaps
this is that doom which Adam fell into of knowing good and evill, that is to say of
knowing good by evill. As therefore the state of man now is; what wisdome can there be
to choose, what continence to forbeare without the knowledge of evill? (Areopagitica,
514)
Milton (CD, 389) dislikes the term original sin and protests against it, but he does agree with the
basic meaning of the term. He (CD, 382) divides sin into single acts of sin and the sin that is
“common to all men.” This common sin is passed on to every human being “[f]or Adam, the parent
and head of all men, either stood or fell as a representative of the whole human race” (CD, 384).
According to Milton (CD, 388)
[e]ach type of sin, common and personal, has two subdivisions . . . evil desire, or the
will to do evil, and the evil deed itself. . . . It was evil desire that our first parents were
originally guilty of. Then they implanted it in all their posterity, since their posterity too
was guilty of that original sin, in the shape of a certain predisposition towards, or, to use
a metaphor, a sort of tinder to kindle sin.
Every human being has this tendency to sin, only Christ is free from this burden (CD, 389-390).
The early Protestants claimed that this idea of people being prone to sin was a key point in
Christianity (Patrides 1966, 102). Milton being a Protestant, this is an important point. Milton wrote
an epic about the matter, so it can be assumed he thought this as a key event in the history of the
human beings. The Roman Catholics view the matter of original sin slightly differently from
Protestants. The Catholics believe that there is something called concupiscence, which is exactly
this tendency to sin, but they disagree with Protestants, because they believe that the actual original
sin can be washed away by baptism (Harent 1911). Protestants believe that the two things are
inseparable, and that the inclination to sin is a part of original sin. It is reasonable to assume that for
Milton, this is an important feature of Christianity as he claims in the quotation above that we all
share the guilt of Adam and Eve. But what is God’s role in all this? Did God not create human
beings foreknowing that they would fall? Is God then ultimately responsible for sin?
12
2.1.1 Evil and God
According to Christianity, God has created everything, then it must logically follow that God has
created at least the sinners, if not sin itself. Forsyth (2003, 47) raises the issue of the origin of Satan:
was he, as the New Testament claims, “a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth,
because there is no truth in him” (John 8:44), or was he an angel who fell, like the Judeo-Christian
tradition tells us? If Satan was evil from the moment he came into being, it would mean that God
did indeed create evil, and this is exactly what Christianity is trying to deny (Forsyth 2003, 47). If
we follow the traditional explanation of Satan’s origin as an angel who fell, we still face the
problem of God being responsible for his creation in the first place. This dilemma has been
explained by the notion of creatio ex nihilo, an idea that God created everything out of nothing and
it follows that everything is less good than God, thus metaphysically evil (Danielson 1982, 29). But,
as I hinted earlier, metaphysical evil cannot really be called evil, since the creature cannot be
blamed if the matter from which it was created is flawed in itself. And as Danielson (1982, 40)
notes: “[t]he problem for theodicy is that, given this doctrine, the creation and thus the individual
creature are seen as coming from the hand of the creator in an already imperfect state; and he,
therefore, not the creature, is responsible for it.” But Milton refuses to entertain such an idea and
replaces it by creatio ex deo (Danielson 1982, 39); according to his interpretation of the Scripture,
all things were created from God because the Scripture suggests that everything was made out of
matter and there cannot have been matter existing prior to God (CD, 307). This does away with
some of the blame that was put on God.
Slotkin (2004, 102) claims that Milton in the Christian Doctrine argues “that God actually
bears a certain kind of responsibility for certain kinds of evil.” Milton (CD, 330) does in fact write:
“God either merely allows evil to happen, by not impending natural causes and free agents, . . . or
else he causes evil by administering chastisement, and this is called the evil of punishment.” So God
does have some part in evil existing, or as God himself states in the Bible: “I form the light, and
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create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things” (Isa. 45:7). I am not
claiming that Milton saw God as evil, he most certainly did not, he saw God as completely good:
“God, who is supremely good, cannot be the source of wickedness, or the evil of crime: on the
contrary he created good out of man’s wickedness” (CD, 331). There is always a problem with
trying to blame God for evil, the Christian go-to-response: “God works in mysterious ways.” We
cannot make any moral judgment on the Christian God, as he is outside the realm of justification.
Cabrera (2001, 24) raises an interesting question: “if God is freed from concerning himself with the
human yearning for justice, then in what sense can religious faith help to resolve the problem of
suffering?” This is true when we fall back on the explanation of ‘human beings could not
understand anyway’. That is why I will try to avoid stating this in my thesis and actually try to look
past religion by using Kantian philosophy.
According to the Free Will Defense, God does not interfere with free choices or natural
causes, he might even bring about good from the evil acts someone performs. As Adam realizes in
Paradise Lost, good comes out of his fall:
O goodness infinite, goodness immense!
That all this good of evil shall produce,
And evil turn to good; more wonderful
Than that which by creation first brought forth
Light out of darkness! Full of doubt I stand,
Whether I should repent me now of sin
By me done and occasioned, or rejoice
Much more, that much more good thereof shall spring,
To God more glory, more good will to men
From God, and over wrath grace shall abound. (PL, XII.469-478)
This might still seem acceptable, but Milton goes on to write: “[e]ven in sin, then, we see God’s
providence at work, not only in permitting it or withdrawing his grace, but often in inciting sinners
to commit sin, hardening their hearts and blinding them” (CD, 331). Milton (CD, 331-332) quotes
different passages from the Bible to prove his point and, at last, specifies what he means by this
dubious inciting to sin:
God does not drive the human heart to sinfulness and deceit when it is innocent and
pure and shrinks from sin. But when it has conceived sin, when it is heavy with it, and
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already giving birth to it, then God as the supreme arbiter of all things turns and points
it in this or that direction or towards this or that object. . . . Neither does God make an
evil will out of a good one, but he directs a will which is already evil so that it may
produce out of its own wickedness either good for others or punishment for itself,
though it does so unknowingly.
God has created everything, including sin, and he has foreknown the evil that was to be when he
created the world, but “we should feel certain that God has not decreed that everything must happen
inevitably. Otherwise we should make him responsible for all the sins ever committed, and should
make demons and wicked men blameless” (CD, 164-165). Louis Arnaud Reid (1925, 28) explains
his view on the matter of God’s responsibility: “the limitation of God’s will by the evil which is the
corollary of finite development is his self-limitation, willed by a perfect will which sees that the
best of all possible worlds is not a ready-made perfect world, but a perfecting world, where
creatures with freedom pursue their chief end, which is the progressive glorification and enjoyment
of God.” God has created the imperfect world we live in, so that we would make his work more
glorious as we sin. But this still seems a bit questionable: did God create human beings, knowing
that they will fall, just to bring more glory to him? I would hazard a guess that no true Christian
would claim this, or acknowledge the problem with it: every created thing is proof of God’s glory
and goodness, and the meaning of life is to serve God. I will now discuss the concept of free will
which tries to explain why God is not responsible for moral evil.
2.1.2 Arminianism
In Milton’s time the Reformation was still making its way through Europe. One of the most
influential people to this movement had been John Calvin, who became a leading figure in this new
movement in 1533 (Webster’s 1999, 181). According to his doctrine the life of human beings was
predetermined by God (Webster’s 1999, 182). One of the basic assumptions of Calvinism is that
even though God decides everything before the creation of the human beings, including whether or
not they receive salvation, evil is still in no way God’s doing. Calvin and his followers tried to deny
God’s responsibility for sin against those who criticized their view by stating that God is just even if
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we do not understand how it is so (Den Boer 2011, 78-79). Among others, a Dutch priest called
Jacob Arminius began criticizing Calvinism and its teachings on this question. There were (and still
are) two ways to view predestination. One view is that there are those who were elected by God to
receive salvation, but even though one is not elected, one can follow Christ and lead a morally good
life to be saved (“Predestination”). The other view, called double predestination holds that there is
nothing one can do to receive salvation if one is not elected by God (“Predestination”). Arminius,
who did not agree with double predestination, was taught by Theodore Beza, a leading figure in
Calvinism (Den Boer 2011, 73), and he did admire his teacher, and Calvin as well, very much even
though he could not accept their explanation of God not being responsible for sin. “Arminius is
particularly concerned that sin committed entirely by the free will be considered in the object of
predestination. He sees no other way to escape the conclusion that God is blamed for sin and is
considered the author of evil” (Den Boer 2011, 76-77). Arminius saw that human beings need to
have free choice in order to retain the guilt of sin. Both Calvinism and Arminianism have
summarized their main teachings in five items. The Calvinist five points were devised at the Synod
of Dort, which was held to address the problem of the rising Dutch movement of Arminianism.
Arminians presented their five key issues as:
1. Conditional election--Election to salvation is contingent upon God’s foreknowledge
of one’s response to generally offered sufficient grace.
2. Unlimited atonement--Christ died for all, and not for the elect only.
3. Total depravity--Without the aid of divine grace, human beings can choose and do
only evil.
4. Resistible grace--Human beings are free to accept or reject divinely offered grace.
5. Mutability of saints/non-perseverance Election is certain only at the end of life;
individuals may choose to reject previously accepted grace. (Fallon 1999)7
The Calvinist points are:
1. Unconditional election--Election is the result of God’s free and arbitrary choice,
without regard to foreknowledge of merit of any sort.
2. Limited atonement---Christ died only for the elect.
3. Total depravity.
4. Irresistible grace--All those to whom grace is offered must accept it; they and only
they are saved.
7 I am using an online version of the article that does not have page numbers.
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5. Perseverance--The elect cannot fall away from grace and salvation. (Fallon 1999)
The main issue where Calvinists and Arminius differ is free will. Arminius maintains that human
beings are created free and thus can choose to accept God’s grace or not. This also does away, at
least to some extent, with the problem of God being behind all evil deeds in the world. Milton
obviously agrees with Arminius on the free will issue, and he has been called Arminian in many
cases. I will refrain from making such limited decisions as labeling Milton as strictly Arminian,
mainly because he himself has sometimes criticized Arminius very strongly (Areopagitica, 519-
520). Even though Milton’s thoughts about free will obviously echo those of Arminius’s, it is
difficult to claim him as being purely Arminian, when he might not have always identified himself
with the doctrine. But I agree with many critics (e.g. Danielson 1982, Bradford 2001) and believe
that if Milton was not completely of the Arminian persuasion, he certainly came very close to it.
2.1.3 Free Will Defense
According to Dennis Danielson (1999, 148), the Free Will Defense is “the model or argument
according to which God, for reasons consistent with his wisdom and goodness, created angels and
human beings with freedom either to obey or disobey his commands.” “The Free Will Defense is a
traditional model to explain how God’s omnipotence and goodness might indeed be asserted, even
given the fact that this world contains evil, particularly moral evil” (Danielson 1982, 92-93). God
limited his control over human wills because, if he had created humans without free will, “no
honesty or loyalty or love could ever have been predicated of such beings” and the amount of good
from free will ultimately surpasses the amount of evil (Danielson 1999, 148-149). There are people
who find this questionable: “[h]ad [God] more generously distributed rationality, grace, and faith, or
even manifested himself frequently in clear and unmistakable ways (and these need not be painful,
unjust ways), and also more clearly revealed the truth about morality, we should be much more
prone to virtue. Yet our wills would remain as free as ever” (McCloskey 1962, 194). Milton (CD,
164), on the other hand, obviously supported the Free Will Defense: “[b]y virtue of his wisdom God
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decreed the creation of angels and men as beings gifted with reason and thus free will. At the same
time he foresaw the direction in which they would tend when they used this absolutely unimpaired
freedom.” Foreknowledge does not imply predetermination: “nothing happens because God has
foreseen it, but rather he has foreseen each event because each is the result of particular causes
which, by his decree, work quite freely and with which he is thoroughly familiar” (CD, 164). This
means that God cannot be blamed for the rational free choices people make, but he is responsible
for providing the freedom: “by giving man free will, God not only allowed him to choose evil, but
also gave him power to create it. Hence, with regard to the evil that man creates, God is responsible
for its possibility, man for its actuality” (Danielson 1982, 201). In addition to Christian Doctrine,
Milton discussed the matter of free will in Paradise Lost. God says to the Son:
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less proved certain unforeknown.
So without least impulse or shadow of fate,
Or aught by me immutably foreseen,
They trespass, authors to themselves in all
Both what they judge and what they choose; for so
I formed them free, and free they must remain,
Till they enthrall themselves: I else must change
Their nature, and revoke the high decree
Unchangeable, eternal, which ordained
Their freedom, they themselves ordained their fall. (PL, III.118-128)
The notion of free will was obviously very important to Milton, as he addresses it, not only in the
two works mentioned, but in many others. In Areopagitica (527) he states:
many there be that complain of divin Providence for suffering Adam to transgresse,
foolish tongues! when God gave him reason, he gave him freedom to choose, for reason
is but choosing; he had bin else a meer artificiall Adam, such an Adam as he is in the
motions. We our selves esteem not of that obedience, or love, or gift, which is of force:
God therefore left him free, set before him a provoking object, ever almost in his eyes
herein consisted his merit, herein the right of his reward, the praise of his abstinence.
God gave Adam free will to choose himself what to do, it is not God’s fault that Adam misused his
freedom. In Christianity’s view, and Milton’s, God will not do evil since he is wholly good, and
thus, if he incites evil in people, there must be a righteous reason behind it.
For an act to be qualified as sin, it requires volition. Debora Shuger discusses the meaning of
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wet dreams and rape in connection with sin. In her discussion, she uses A Masque as an example of
chastity being under a threat that has nothing to do with volition (Shuger 1997, 2). Shuger (1997,
10) claims that “Christian theology . . . focuses, at times almost obsessively, on this liminal zone of
autopiloting thoughts and desires.” Saint Augustine (City of God, I.25) argues that involuntary
occurrences (wet dreams, rape) cannot stain the purity of the mind: “disobedience of the body is not
to be blamed when one is asleep, still less when there is no consent.” Shuger (1997, 3), following
Saint Augustine, reasons that “[t]he lust that moves one’s members in sleep to do that which he
would not testifies to the flesh’s rebellion against the spirit with shameful clarity and yet, because
the dreamer does not consent to his own pollution, these nocturnal accidents are not sins.” She
(1997, 3) continues with this line of reasoning and compares, as does Saint Augustine, wet dreams
with being raped, and this is where A Masque comes into the picture: “a woman thus violated, even
if she found herself sexually aroused, incurs no guilt” because she has not consented. Shuger (1997,
2) sees the Lady under the threat of rape as Comus has bound her into a chair and tries to tempt her
into drinking the potion, because he could easily force her physically to drink. I am not convinced
with her interpretation of the scene as a rape in progress, but the question of sin and volition is a
sound one. It is true that Comus could force the Lady to drink, but it is not really necessary to bring
sex into the equation. Violence does not inevitably mean rape. Shuger (1997, 4) comes to the
conclusion that the Lady “although ensnared, . . . remains guiltless.” Milton’s other works seem to
support this notion. After a disturbing dream Eve has had, Adam condoles her:
Evil into the mind of god or man
May come and go, so unapproved, and leave
No spot or blame behind: which gives me hope
That what in sleep thou didst abhor to dream,
Waking thou never wilt consent to do. (PL, V.117-121)
The dream was planted by Satan but this does not diminish the importance of Adam’s utterance;
dreams are not willed by the dreamer. The Son also dreams in Paradise Regained. He has been
soliloquizing and ends with:
from the sting of Famine fear no harm,
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Nor mind it, fed with better thoughts than feed
Me hung’ring more to do my Father’s will. (PR, II.257-259)
Right after this he goes to sleep. And he does not dream of doing his Father’s will, he dreams of
food. This is not in any way a slur against him, it only proves that even the Son of God cannot
control dreams.
2.2 Classical references in a Christian masque
“A Masque has been described as a ‘Puritan masque’, since it seems to contain at least oblique
references to the Puritan mistrust of rowdy popular games, together with other references to empty
and wasteful displays of luxury and even to unequal distribution of wealth” (Flannagan 1989, 24).
Flannagan (1989, 24) also notes that this Puritan reading must be done very carefully since Puritans
were not a unified group at the time. The stage directions are useful here: when Comus first
appears, his entourage is depicted as “making a riotous and unruly noise” (A Masque, p. 181) and
later, his abode is “a stately palace, set out with all the manner of deliciousness” (A Masque, p.
209). When Comus and his rabble appear they
welcome joy and feast,
Midnight shout and revelry,
Tipsy dance and jollity. (A Masque, 102-104)
This is more than enough to raise the suspicions of good Christians. And when it comes to “empty
and wasteful displays of luxury” (Flannagan 1989, 24), the Lady accepts the offer made by Comus,
dressed as shepherd, to find safety in his humble cottage:
Shepherd, I take thy word,
And trust the honest-offered courtesy,
Which oft is sooner found in lowly sheds,
With smoky rafters, than in tap’stry halls
And courts of princes, where it first was named,
And yet is most pretended (A Masque, 320-325)
A Christian reading of the masque is in fact available through the character of Comus without it
being necessarily Puritan:
Comus seeks to tempt the Lady to drink his “orient liquor” and join him in sins of
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intemperance, pride, and lust, just as Satan would tempt Eve into similar failings with
the apple. Here the Christian allegory is readily apparent. Comus lurks with other deities
of night and debauchery, (Coytto and Hecate, for example), and the true Christian must
ever be wary of the traps they provide (“Blending Classical, Pastoral, and Religious
Imagery in Comus”).
The claim that A Masque is a Christian story is valid, but to over-simplify and state that there are no
other nuances in the masque would be dubious. As the above quote hints, there is an abundance of
classical deities found in A Masque. This is typical of Milton’s writing; in his discussion about
Paradise Lost, Forsyth (2000, 518) states: “[t]his uneven mixing of classical and Christian sources
is characteristic.” When it comes to evil, Forsyth (2000, 518) offers a relevant point for this thesis:
“[t]he problem of evil itself might be Judeo-Christian, but Milton’s means of representing it to the
imagination are often classical.” I will now bring up some of those classical references connected
with the two main characters in the masque.
2.2.1 The Character of Comus
A Masque is full of allusions to Ancient Roman and Greek mythologies. Even the etymology of the
name of the main character comes from Greek: “The Greek komoi meant ‘a revel’” (Flannagan
1989, 21) and Brewer’s Concise Phrase and Fable (1999, 237) gives it the etymology of komos
meaning ‘carousal,’ both meaning a loud, noisy festivity. There is an apparent intermixing of
classical and Christian references and themes in A Masque that goes beyond etymology. The
classical allusions connected with the character of Comus emphasize his evil side:
Within the navel of this hideous wood,
Immured in cypress shades, a sorcerer dwells,
Of Bacchus, and of Circe born, great Comus (A Masque, 519-521)
Bacchus is of course the god of wine in Roman mythology and the counterpart of the Greek
Dionysus, and the word Bacchus “was originally merely an epithet of Dionysus as the noisy and
rowdy god” (Brewer’s 1999, 62). The mother of Comus, Circe, was the sorceress who turned the
companions of Ulysses into swine (Brewer’s 1999, 212). In an earlier quotation, Comus was
connected with Cotytto and Hecate. He invokes these deities in his first speech:
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Hail goddess of nocturnal sport
Dark-veiled Cotytto, to whom the secret flame
Of midnight torches burns; mysterious dame
That ne’er art called, but when the dragon womb
Of Stygian darkness spits her thickest gloom,
And makes one blot of all the air,
Stay thy cloudy ebon chair,
Wherein thou rid’st with Hecat’, and befriend
Us thy vowed priests (A Masque, 128-136)
Cotytto is a “Thracian goddess of immodesty and debauchery” (Brewer’s 1999, 248) and “whose
midnight orgies were so obscene that they disgusted even the goddess herself” (Brewer’s 1999, 71).
Hecate on the other hand was not always connected with the dark side of life. She was the Greek
“goddess of ghosts and black magic. Originally represented as a beneficial goddess with the power
to grant good fortune, she was later associated with evil and the underworld” (The New Webster’s
International Encyclopedia 1999, 486). There are, therefore, hints within these classical allusions
that Comus might not be identical with evil.
I argue that the character of Comus is not to be seen as wholly evil, as there are ways of
reading him as multidimensional. There are in fact people who do see Comus as a flat character.
One of them is Cheryl Rogers Resetarits (2006, 86), who argues that Comus is a secondary figure in
the masque. She (2006, 86) claims that “[s]econdary figures often mirror aspects of the
protagonist(s).” With this claim I can agree, Comus represents darkness when the Lady can be read
as good. Resetarits (2006, 83) claims that the reason Milton’s masque has these flat characters is the
following:
The narrowed, one-dimensional nature of characters and actions is, of course,
due partly to the age of the principals and the straightforward, non-ambivalent virtue
that their parents would want to see displayed at a family entertainment, but it is also in
keeping with the fairy-tale effect of Comus, for in all fairy tales polarization of character
is the rule, a very functional rule.
It is true that Milton probably did want to emphasize the goodness of the Lady and the evil in
Comus, but it does not follow automatically that Comus is one-dimensional. Furthermore,
Resetarits (2006, 86) claims that the Lady is a primary figure. I do not follow her reasoning how
Comus can be one-dimensionally evil but the Lady would be multidimensional. It has to be noted
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that Resetarits interprets A Masque from the standpoint of it being a fairy tale. Her reasoning leaves
unanswered questions as A Masque is written as a masque, not a fairy tale, so aspects of it may not
conform to theory used to interpret actual fairy tales. But I would hope that a critic would see
beyond the theoretical framework and not try to force a text into a set of ideas based on completely
different genre of literature. I will now try to refute what Resetarits is saying by delving more
deeply into the character of Comus.
It has to be highlighted that, although Comus is surrounded by references to dark gods and
goddesses, these divinities are not unequivocally evil: “Circe, though she is the personification of
sensual corruption, is also the daughter of the sun; her son Comus is also attractive in an evil way,
mixing images of goodness with evil intentions, in the same way that the angel of light, Lucifer,
becomes Satan” (Flannagan 1989, 32). Comus is known for
Offering to every weary traveller,
His orient liquor in a crystal glass,
To quench the drougth of Phoebus. (A Masque, 64-66)
Comus is mixing evil intentions with goodness, as he offers to quench the thirst of the tired people
who are traveling through the woods. Although the travelers should know better, they drink from
the ominous crystal glass, “most do taste through fond intemperate thirst” (A Masque, 68), and turn
into monsters. Comus is a tempter, he does not force people to drink, and it is possible to make a
morally sound choice of not drinking. I will return to this possibility later in this thesis.
As we can see in the the earlier quotation from Flannagan (1989, 32), Lucifer and Satan are
traditionally thought to be the same being before and after his fall. This is not quite the case
according to modern thinking, the famous passage in the Bible – “How art thou fallen from heaven,
O Lucifer, son of the morning!” (Isa. 14:12) – is actually spoken to a king of Babylon (Forsyth
2003, 80). The connection to Satan was created by the Church Fathers (Forsyth 2003, 51). Milton
willingly exploits the tradition and connects his Satan with this tradition:
Lucifer from heaven
(So call him, brighter once amidst the host
Of angels, than that star the stars among)
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Fell with his flaming legions through the deep (PL, VII.131-134)
In Paradise Regained Satan speaks about his former state: “I have lost / Much lustre of my native
brightness” (PR, I.377-378). Comus, on the other hand, is connected with the evening star,
Hesperus – “The star that bids the shepherd fold, / Now the top of heaven doth hold” (A Masque,
93-94) – but it is “[t]he name given by the Greeks to the planet Venus as an evening star. As a
morning star it was called Lucifer” (Brewer’s 1999, 499). But the morning star is not only used to
refer to Satan or Comus, it is also used in connection with the Son in Paradise Regained: “So spake
our morning star” (PR, I.294). Even the Bible refers to Jesus as the morning star: “I Jesus have sent
mine angel to testify unto you these things in the churches. I am the root and the offspring of David,
and the bright and morning star” (Rev. 22:169). Milton drawing on these matters seems to hint that
there is some sort of connection between the Son and Satan. I will investigate this further in a later
chapter. The main point about the character of Comus being a mixture of light and dark objects
remains valid.
2.2.2 The Chaste Lady
Whereas most of the allusions connected with Comus are evil, the ones connected with the Lady
highlight her virtues:
Hence had the huntress Dian her dread bow
Fair silver-shafted queen for ever chaste,
Wherewith she tamed the brinded lioness
And spotted mountain pard, but set at nought
The frivolous bolt of Cupid, gods and men
Feared her stern frown, and she was queen o’ the woods.
What was that snaky-headed Gorgon shield
That wise Minerva wore, unconquered virgin (A Masque, 440-447)
Moon-goddess Diana and the goddess of wisdom Minerva are both Roman deities. The Greek
equivalents are Artemis and Athena (Brewer’s 1999, 443). Artemis was the virgin goddess of
hunting and a protector of chastity (Webster’s 1999, 71). Webster’s (1999, 79) defines Athena as the
“goddess of wisdom, war and peace, who sprang fully grown from the head of Zeus.” The
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goddesses seem to create an image of the Lady as firmly chaste and completely ready to defend
herself if the need for it arises. But this is not as self-evident as one might first be tempted to think.
Minerva is “fabled to have sprung, with a tremendous battle-cry, fully armed from the head of
Jupiter” (Brewer’s 1999, 676) and she “came to symbolize military prowess” (Webster’s 1999, 709).
The “snaky-headed Gorgon shield” Minerva, or Athena wore is called Aegis (Webster’s 1999, 709).
It has the head of a Gorgon mounted on it (Brewer’s 1999, 12) and thus has the power to turn people
into stone (Brewer’s 1999, 450). But Aegis does have an interesting and relevant symbolic meaning
for this thesis: it is a symbol of divine protection (Brewer’s 1999, 12). As with all classical gods and
goddesses, it is never simply a question of good or evil, but a mixture of both as the Greek and the
Romans saw their gods as fallible as human beings are. They get jealous, angry, and vindictive, and
might take it out on the poor humans inhabiting the earth. I am not implying that the Lady is evil,
only that rarely are things as simple as they first seem.
The virtue of chastity is very strongly emphasized in the masque:
O welcome pure-eyed Faith, white-handed Hope,
Thou hovering angel girt with golden wings,
And thou unblemished form of Chastity (A Masque, 212-214)
“By thus clearly evoking and altering the traditional biblical trio of faith, hope, and charity, Milton
places strong emphasis on the Lady’s chastity as a central characteristic of her identity” (“Blending
Classical, Pastoral, and Religious Imagery in Comus”). These Christian virtues are found in the
Bible: “[a]nd now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity” (1
Cor. 13:13). This hints that in A Masque, the greatest virtue is chastity instead of charity. This
creates the image that the Christian love is left out from the great virtues. And it does seem to be so
as chastity is emphasized so much in A Masque. One has to rely only on himself or herself in order
to be safe. The Elder Brother claims that the Lady is quite safe as she has:
but yet a hidden strength
Which if heaven gave it, may be termed her own:
‘Tis chastity, my brother, chastity:
She that has that, is clad in complete steel (A Masque, 417-420)
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The image of being fully armored ties in with the image of Minerva/Athena and the protective force
of chastity can be seen to be granted by God, as the image of Aegis was linked to the Lady. This
view is also emphasized with the Attendant Spirit being sent to protect the children from Comus.
The trust in the protective force of chastity is not shared by the Second Brother: he fears for his
sister’s safety:
But O that hapless virgin our lost sister
Where may she wander now, whether betake her
From the chill dew, amongst rude burs and thistles?
Perhaps some cold bank is her bolster now
Or ‘gainst the rugged bark of some broad elm
Leans her unpillowed head fraught with sad fears,
What if in wild amazement, and affright,
Or while we speak within the direful grasp
Of savage hunger, or of savage heat? (A Masque, 349-357)
The Elder Brother tries to calm his brother: “What need a man forestall his date of grief, / And run
to meet what he would most avoid?” (A Masque, 361-362). He tries to keep the Second Brother
from imagine the worst that could happen before they actually know what has happened. This does
not work, the Second Brother is convinced that the Lady is in great peril because she is beautiful:
For who would rob a hermit of his weeds,
His few books, or his beads, or maple dish,
Or do his gray hairs any violence?
But Beauty like the fair Hesperian tree
Laden with blooming gold, had need the guard
Of dragon-watch with unenchanted eye,
To save her blossoms, and defend her fruit
From the rash hand of bold Incontinence. (A Masque, 389-396)
The Elder Brother responds that their sister is “Secure without all doubt, or controversy” (A
Masque, 408) because she has chastity. The Second Brother shows signs of doubt in divine
providence, even though the Elder Brother tries to calm him. The Elder Brother shares the Lady’s
unshakeable belief in the force of chastity, but the Second Brother is not quite convinced: “Heaven
keep my sister, again, again and near” (A Masque, 485). He is praying, but does not have the
courage of his brother and sister to give himself completely to the providence of God. This, of
course, does not make him evil, only human. As the Attendant Spirit speaks to the parents of the
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children after he has gotten them home, he claims:
Heaven hath timely tried their youth,
Their faith, their patience, and their truth,
And sent them here through hard assays
With a crown of deathless praise,
To triumph in victorious dance
O’er sensual folly, and intemperance. (A Masque, 969-974)
But this does not really describe all of them. The Brothers did not display really strong signs of
patience. The Second Brother refuses to rely on divine protection of their sister and they fail to do
as they are told when they attack Comus and his rabble with swords. The trial did not prove the
Brothers to be unquestionably worthy, but luckily for them, the Lady remained obedient and chaste.
The “sun-clad power of chastity” (A Masque, 781) is the thing that ultimately keeps the Lady safe.
For Milton, chastity was the purity of life in general, it did not merely mean virginity, and it
concerns both sexes (Patrides 1966, 165-166). Thus the Lady is doing what God expects from her,
she remains true to the Christian values and will obtain grace and salvation. The Lady has chosen to
remain chaste, even though she knows Comus might force her to drink his potion:
Thou canst not touch the freedom of my mind
With all thy charms, although this corporal rind
Thou haste immanacled, while heaven sees good. (A Masque, 662-664)
The protective strength of chastity seems to dwell with God:
So dear to heaven is saintly chastity,
That when a soul is found sincerely so,
A thousand liveried angels lackey her,
Driving far off each thing of sin and guilt (A Masque, 452-455)
This echoes the Bible: “[f]or he shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways”
(Ps. 91:11). God’s divine providence will keep those safe who believe and are worthy. This divine
providence can be seen as an argument for predestination, but this is a fallacy. God does help those
who are worthy, but only because they have been foreseen by God as worthy. The people who
believe in God and free will would argue that God’s decisions are, and will be, beyond human
comprehension. This aiding of the worthy seems to be the case for Milton as his God sends the
Attendant Spirit to guard righteous travelers from Comus:
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Therefore when any favoured of high Jove,
Chances to pass through this advent’rous glade,
Swift as the sparkle of a glancing star,
I shoot from heaven to give him safe convoy. (A Masque, 78-81)
Both the masque and the poem do in fact highlight virtues and virtuous people. But this
emphasis is done in a way that necessarily does not immediately appeal to a reader, Satan and
Comus are very amusing and colorful characters while the Lady and the Son seem somewhat plain.
But behind this plainness hides virtue. Both the Lady and the Son do not stray from the path of
good decisions for the duration of the texts, they resist temptation. “He that can apprehend and
consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet
prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring Christian” (Areopagitica, 514-515). It is the
hidden strength of these characters that makes a subtle impression. “Milton in Comus is concerned
with moderation in general but selects temperance for particular treatment” (Patrides 1966, 115).
According to Milton (CD, 724), “[t]emperance includes sobriety and chastity, modesty and
decency.” In Stein’s (1965, 24) view “[t]emperance is for Milton primarily the virtue of self-
mastery, discipline.” It does not mean abstinence, even though Comus thinks so:
O foolishness of men! that lend their ears
To those budge doctors of the Stoic fur,
And fetch their precepts from the Cynic tub,
Praising the lean and sallow Abstinence.
Wherefore did Nature pour her bounties forth,
With such a full and unwithdrawing hand,
Covering the earth with odours, fruits, and flocks,
Thronging the seas with spawn innumerable,
But all to please, and sate the curious taste? (A Masque, 705-713)
After he has pleaded that the things Nature provides are meant to be enjoyed, the Lady responds:
Imposter do not charge most innocent Nature,
As if she would her children should be riotous
With her abundance she good cateress
Means her provision only to the good
That live according to her sober laws,
And holy dictate of spare temperance. (A Masque, 761-766)
Moderation does not strike one as particularly exciting, but it nonetheless is the thing Milton would
like the reader to pick up from the text.
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Milton has an interesting way of making the reader to think about the choice between good
and evil. The enticements of Comus are not plain or boring, or even without reason. In the
temptation about using natural resources, Comus appeals to the glory of God:
The all-giver would be unthanked, would be unpraised,
Not half his riches known, and yet despised,
And we should serve him as a grudging master,
As a penurious niggard of his wealth,
And live like Nature’s bastards, not her sons. (A Masque, 722-726)
After all, even the Bible teaches that all of nature was created for human beings to use:
And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish
the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl
of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. And God said,
Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the
earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be
for meat. And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing
that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green herb for
meat: and it was so. (Gen. 1:28-30)
This is disturbingly the same argument used in current debate about using natural resources without
regard to global warming or the fact that we are using up these resources faster than they can renew
themselves. It is depressing that we use the Bible – which is not by any means universally seen as
the word of God, nor is it to be taken literally in modern time as life has changed drastically since
biblical times – as reasoning behind a seemingly rational argument over the welfare of our planet.
The Lady believes in even moderate distribution of wealth:
If every just man that now pines with want
Had but a moderate and beseeming share
Of that which lewdly-pampered Luxury
Now heaps upon some few with vast excess,
Nature’s full blessings would be well-dispensed
In unsuperfluous even proportion. (A Masque, 767-772)
This is exactly the Christian thing to do: charity includes sharing your good fortune with those in
need. But it is a completely different matter whether or not the Lady personally is prepared to share
her wealth with her servants, as one might expect after this speech, but this matter is not discussed
in the masque, nor is it to be expected from a text written in a time where the relationship between
the ruling class and the common people was nothing like it is today, so I will not go into the matter
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any further. I do want to state that of course the Lady believes what she says, otherwise it would not
be considered true, but I cannot help but to wonder if she (the Lady in the masque) would actually
do the socially unacceptable thing and actually distribute her wealth among the farmers and servants
of her house.
Patrides (1966, 205) claims that the Lady and Jesus are ready and willing to listen to God and
this is the only way of obtaining grace. On the other hand, Satan and Comus do not choose to open
themselves to God’s word. Satan is constantly abusing the Bible in his temptations; he picks up
certain details from it whereas the Son sees the bigger picture and quotes a more significant passage
from the Scriptures. The Son wins because he knows how to interpret the Bible correctly. He argues
for reason and truth, thus must win. “But let them chaunt while they will of prerogatives, we shall
tell them of Scripture; of custom, we of Scripture; of Acts and Statutes, stil of Scripture, til the
quick and pearcing word enter to the dividing of their soules, & the mighty weaknes of the Gospel
throw down the weak mightines of mans reasoning” (Reason of Church-Government, 827). The last
temptation serves as a perfect example; Satan has just placed the Son on top of the temple in
Jerusalem and says:
Now show thy progeny; if not to stand,
Cast thyself down; safely if Son of God:
For it is written, He will give command
Concerning thee to his angels, in their hands
They shall uplift thee, lest at any time
Thou chance to dash thy foot against a stone. (PR, IV.554-559)
The passage Satan is referring to is the one I quoted earlier in connection to the Lady being
protected by God – “For he shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. They
shall bear thee up in their hands, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone” (Ps. 91:11-12). The Son
answers: “Also it is written, / Tempt not the Lord thy God” (PR, 560-561) and wins the argument.
Comus is also depicted as deaf to God’s word when the Lady scolds him for lying to her: “Thou
hast nor ear, nor soul to apprehend / The sublime notion, and high mystery” (A Masque, 783-784).
This echoes the Bible’s “He that hath ears to hear, let him hear” (Matt. 11:15). Satan and Comus
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have both closed their ears to God and thus have abandoned the hope of being saved.
I will now turn to the more obviously Christian work, Paradise Regained.
2.3 The Judeo-Christian Tradition and Paradise Regained
The main plot in Paradise Regained is taken from the gospels of Matthew and Luke. After his
baptism Jesus is led by the Spirit into the wilderness where he is tempted by Satan. Apart from the
gospels, Paradise Regained is a lot like the story of Job, who is also tried by Satan. The main part
of the Book of Job is a debate between Job and four of his friends about Job’s situation and this is
the key to the similarity noted by Mary Ann Radzinowicz (1999, 202) that I mentioned earlier:
Paradise Regained and the Book of Job are both debate poems. Paradise Regained is mainly a
debate between Satan and the Son, where Satan sets the action into motion by trying to persuade the
Son to accept what he has to offer. The Son answers and supports his arguments with Scripture.
This discussion repeats itself until the Son finally conquers Satan who has exhausted all his wiles.
There is an interesting detail in the role of Satan described in the Book of Job: he acts as a
servant of God (Rosenfeld 2008, 6); “the sons of God came to present themselves before the LORD,
and Satan came also among them” (Job 1:6). Satan claims that Job obviously loves God since God
has blessed him with happiness: “Doth Job fear God for nought? Hast not thou made an hedge
about him, and about his house, and about all that he hath on every side? thou hast blessed the work
of his hands” (Job 1:9-10). Satan claims that God has chosen Job to receive grace and thus Job has
been blessed with a good life. God wants to prove Job’s obedience and gives Satan permission to
try Job’s faith: “And the LORD said unto Satan, Behold, all that he hath is in thy power; only upon
himself put not forth thine hand” (Job 1:12). Satan “is a kind of prosecutor or attorney general who
is granted God’s permission to act as the tempter of man after a dialogue with God about the source
of Job’s virtue” (Forsyth 2003, 37). Job does not curse God, he remains faithful and is finally
rewarded by God’s providence. According to Milton (CD, 338), the temptation of Job was a good
temptation “which God uses to tempt even righteous men, in order to prove them.” The matter of
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Job being blessed in the beginning of the story can be seen as God having chosen him to receive
grace, but it does not diminish the freedom of Job’s choice, when he keeps his faith even in times of
dire circumstances. As for the authorship of evil, it seems logically plausible that God is in fact
somewhat responsible for the suffering of humans, at least the suffering of the righteous ones; but
for a true Christian, God is always right, even though human beings do not understand God’s
reasons.
 As I have been arguing, there are no completely evil characters in Milton’s work. Even
though the character of Satan is based on the Christian equivalent, he still is not evil personified. I
believe that this is somewhat intentional from Milton’s part: “[t]he ambivalence of Satan’s relation
to evil is important for the meaning of the poem” (Forsyth 2003, 188). Even though Forsyth refers
to Paradise Lost, the same goes for Paradise Regained. If Satan was personified evil, surely his evil
would know no limits; “Satan has nothing to offer but man’s power over man or nature, for the sake
of power. As a victim of self pursuing an inevitable course, Satan illustrates, or rather surveys and
establishes the limits of evil, so that the captive minds may cease to admire” (Stein 1965, 132).
Stein (1965, 58-59) discusses this limiting aspect as Satan being forced to tempt in the way he does
“because of something essential in the general character of evil which is brought out by this
particular drama.” Satan might be seriously limited in his evil. “Satan can neither become fully evil,
because he always evidences some degree of brightness and virtue, nor, despite all his efforts, can
he ever bring about the negation of life; all his designs pervert and delay but ultimately serve the
good” (Colebrook 2008, 84). Satan is stuck in a sort of eternal limbo between good and evil,
because he is human enough to be capable of both. In the course of the shift from the Satan in
Paradise Lost to the Satan in Paradise Regained, his self is changing. The one seen in Paradise
Regained
is ‘human.’ The term is of course not precise, but we have a rough standard to go by.
Back of this Satan we may have an idea of Evil, and it is not entirely misleading to
remember the dramatizing of that idea in Paradise Lost –  if we remember this is a
standard, and do not confuse the characters as interchangeable. Besides, we have a
standard – mythic, philosophical, and literary – for the role of cosmic evil engaged in a
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universal conflict. But we have already seen signs that in this, the second stage of the
conflict, cosmic evil has become recognizably more domestic in character. (Stein 1965,
52)
Satan has reached a point in his “career,” where he has become almost human, as he drifts further
away from God and his power. This all results from his evil desire to rebel and his choice of letting
his self-love rule over morality.
As Satan is humanized in Paradise Regained, so is the Son. He is considered as fully human
as Jesus: “For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus” (1.
Tim. 2:5). As the Son is human when he roams the desert, he is not God. “The Son, that is, partook
of the divine nature, and substance, but his portion of divinity was not total” (Rosenfeld 2008, 86).
Even though he is not God in every sense of the word, he is unquestionably the hero of the poem.
As I noted earlier, the Son’s heroism is not active and violent, he fights Satan verbally. “For Jesus,
knowledge, language, and action are synonymous” (Goldsmith 1987, 132). He represents more a
hero from the Middle Ages, than the heroes of the classical epics. “The legendary or epic hero of the
Greeks is a man of great physical might (Hercules), passion (Achilles), or cunning (Ulysses). . . . In
the Middle Ages, the ideal of physical (or even mental) prowess is replaced by an emphasis on
spiritual valor” (Kahn 1953, 106). The Son exemplifies true heroism by his constant displays of
obedience and virtue (Patrides 1966, 161). Satan tries to tempt the Son with riches and power to
rule:
Therefore, if at great things thou wouldst arrive,
Get riches first, get wealth, and treasure heap,
Not difficult, if thou hearken to me,
Riches are mine, fortune is in my hand;
They whom I favour thrive in wealth amain,
While virtue, valor, wisdom sit in want. (PR, II.426-431)
The Son refuses this with a list of rulers with humble origins, which I will discuss in the next
chapter: Gideon, Jephthah, and David. The Son also refutes that wealth has any importance for him,
and states that self-discipline is the key:
Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules
Passions, desires, and fears, is more a king;
33
Which every wise and virtuous man attains:
And who attains not, ill aspires to rule
Cities of men, or headstrong multitudes,
Subject himself to anarchy within,
Or lawless passions in him which he serves. (PR, II.466-472)
The Miltonic view of temperance is certainly present here. Moderation is the road to victory. Even
though the refusal of the Son seems easy, Satan might have hit a nerve when he began the
temptation: “For no allurement yields to appetite, / And all thy heart is set on high designs” (PR,
II.409-410). The Son wants to do his Father proud but, nonetheless, he resists temptation.
2.3.1 The Son
In addition to being likened to Job multiple times, the Son in Paradise Regained is compared to
many other characters of the Bible. The Virgin Mary remembers the angelic messenger who
announced the birth of Jesus:
A messenger from God foretold thy birth
Conceived in me a virgin, he foretold
Thou shouldst be great and sit on David’s Throne,
And of thy Kingdom there should be no end. (PR, I.238-241)
King David was the second king of Israel, a shepherd, chosen by God to rule Israel. His reign is
regarded highly in the Jewish tradition because “he seized Jerusalem, making it the religious and
political capital of Israel” (Webster’s 1999, 291). He has traditionally been seen as the predecessor
of Jesus, a type of Messiah. Jesus himself compares himself to bear a likeness to David in a passage
I quoted earlier from the Bible in this thesis (“I am the root and the offspring of David, and the
bright and morning star”). King David’s predecessor and successor are also used in relation to the
Son in Paradise Regained. Saul, the first king of Israel, “he who seeking asses found a Kingdom”
(PR, III.242) was searching for his father’s lost asses when the prophet Samuel anointed him the
king of Israel by God’s command (1 Sam. 9-10). The third king of Israel, Solomon, was the cause of
the kingdom’s division into two, but he was considered very wise up until that point. Even though
Belial suggests that Satan should tempt the Son with women, Satan is convinced that the Son will
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not fall for the same enticements as Solomon:
But he whom we attempt is wiser far
The Solomon, of more exalted mind,
Made and set wholly on the accomplishment
Of greatest things (PR, II.205-208)
Solomon caused the kingdom of Israel to be torn apart because of his idolatry; he had many wives
and concubines and he began to serve their gods instead of the one God.
Wherefore the LORD said unto Solomon, Forasmuch as this is done of thee, and thou
hast not kept my covenant and my statutes, which I have commanded thee, I will surely
rend the kingdom from thee, and will give it to thy servant. Notwithstanding in thy days
I will not do it for David thy father’s sake: but I will rend it out of the hand of thy son.
(1 Kings 11:11-12)
This refusal and reference to Solomon is prompted by Belial’s suggestion to appeal to the Son’s
carnal desires, but is quickly dismissed by Satan with “Belial, in much uneven scale thou weigh’st /
All others by thyself” (PR, II.173-174), but it is not only Solomon who fell for the wrong women. I
will return to this in a later chapter.
The period of time Jesus spends in the wilderness offers a way of referring to other biblical
stories. In the beginning, Satan, dressed as an old man, suggests that the Son would turn stones into
bread, after all, he must be hungry after forty days of not eating. The Son answers:
in the mount
Moses was forty days, nor eat nor drank,
And forty days Elijah without food
Wandered this barren waste (PR, I.351-354)
Moses was on Mount Sinai for forty days (Ex. 24:18) and Elijah traveled forty days and forty nights
to Mount Horeb (1 Kings 19:8). Neither of them ate anything for that period of time. A little later
Satan tries to get the Son to admit he needs food and that God should provide it for him:
all the race
Of Israel here had famished, had not God
Rained from heaven manna, and that prophet bold
Native of Thebez wandering here was fed
Twice by a voice inviting him to eat.
Of thee these forty days none hath regard,
Forty and more deserted here indeed. (PR, II.310-316)
The people of Israel were fed by God with manna during their forty years in the desert ( Ex. 16:35)
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and the “Native of Thebez” is Elijah. He was woken up twice by an angel to get up and eat so that
he would have the strength to climb up Mount Horeb (1 Kings 19:5-8). The Son answers Satan with
“They all had need, I as thou seest, have none” (PR, II.318). Although the temptation is about food
on the surface, there lies a deeper more significant meaning of belief in God’s providence at the
bottom. This ties in with the argument that even though you might need something (a drink of water
or food), it matters where it comes from. Satan questions how is it possible that the Son is hungry if
he does not need food and asks “Tell me if food were now before thee set, / Wouldst thou not eat?”
(PR, II.320-321) to which the Son replies simply “Thereafter as I like / The giver” (PR, II.321-322).
In A Masque, The Lady had summarized the point behind this reasoning:
I would not taste thy treasonous offer; none
But such as are good men can give good things,
And that which is not good, is not delicious
To a well-governed and wise appetite. (A Masque, 701-704)
The actual physical urges are not evil in themselves, but they can be if one heeds to them blindly. I
will address this further when I discuss Kantian philosophy. And, as the Lady and the Son both have
proven, it is possible to recognize a treacherous offer for help, if one is alert enough. “To the pure
all things are pure, not only meats and drinks, but all kinde of knowledge whether of good or evill;
the knowledge cannot defile, nor consequently the books, if the will and conscience be not defil’d”
(Areopagitica, 512). Temptation is indeed needed:
Wherefore did he creat passions within us, pleasures round about us, but that these
rightly temper’d are the very ingredients of vertu? They are not skilfull considerers of
human things, who imagin to remove sin by removing the matter of sin; . . . and when
this is done, yet the sin remains entire. Though ye take from a covetous man all his
treasure, he has yet one jewell left, ye cannot bereave him of his covetousnesse. Banish
all objects of lust, shut up all youth into the severest discipline that can be exercis’d in
any hermitage, ye cannot make them chaste, that came not thither so: such great care
and wisdom is requir’d to the right managing of this point. Suppose we could expell sin
by this means; look how much we thus expell of sin, so much we expell of vertue: for
the matter of them both is the same; remove that, and ye remove them both alike. This
justifies the high providence of God, who though he command us temperance, justice,
continence, yet powrs out before us ev’n to a profusenes all desirable things, and gives
us minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety. (Areopagitica, 527-528)
The tempter is not really to blame if he or she who he tempts falls. Adam and Eve fell tempted by
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Satan, but they themselves are to blame, not Satan. God claims:
so will fall,
He and his faithless progeny: whose fault?
Whose but his own? Ingrate, he had of me
All he could have; I made him just and right,
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. (PL, III.95-99)
In Paradise Regained the way to salvation is made equally clear as in A Masque: obedience
and humility. But the virtue of “obedience is not tainted by servility but is the free worship of God”
(Patrides 166, 161-162). Milton’s view of obedience as the key to serving God is made obvious
when Adam realizes how he must go about serving God after the Fall:
Henceforth I learn, that to obey is best,
And love with fear the only God, to walk
As in his presence, ever to observe
His providence, and on him sole depend,
Merciful over all his works, with good
Still overcoming evil, and by small
Accomplishing great things, by things deemed weak
Subverting worldly strong, and worldly wise
By simply meek (PL, XII.561-569)
Danielson (1982, 90) sees that “to serve God is, as it were, but to stand and wait and to observe
providence, because it is by grace alone that evil is overcome with good.” He (1982, 90) calls it
patient heroism. This notion is even clearer in Paradise Regained than it is in Paradise Lost: After
the Son has overcome Satan, the angels sing praises to him, but the poem ends on a very humble
note:
Thus they the Son of God our Saviour meek
Sung victor, and, from heavenly feast refreshed
Brought on his way with joy; he unobserved
Home to his mother’s house private returned (PR, IV.636-639)
In his moment of victory, the Son is not referred to as heroic or great, he is “our Saviour meek” and
he quietly goes home.
In one temptation, Satan claims that Jesus should gather wealth before he can claim the
throne of Israel, but Jesus answers with a list of people of humble origins who had risen to power:
“Gideon and Jephtha, and the shepherd lad” (PR, II.439). Gideon was a “leader and judge of Israel
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who, by his exploits in repelling the desert raiders, the Midianites, became a national hero,” he later
refused the crown offered to him (Webster’s 1999, 436). He came from a very poor family and he
doubted that God could have chosen him to such a significant task, so he asked for proof multiple
times and God gave proof in the form of controlling the morning dew first to dampen only a fleece
put outside by Jephthah and second dampening the ground but not the fleece, and Gideon was
finally convinced that the Lord had chosen him to be a champion of God (Judg. 6:11-40). After God
had put Gideon’s mind at ease, he followed the instructions of God and led Israel to defeat their
enemy. Even though Gideon was offered the crown of Israel, he did not accept but said “the LORD
shall rule over you” (Judg. 8:23). The other biblical figure paired with Gideon in Paradise Regained
is Jephthah, a son of a harlot, who defeated the Ammonites after he had promised to sacrifice the
first thing he saw when he would arrive home after the victory to God; God helped him and
Jephthah was forced to sacrifice his daughter (Judg. 11). The ‘shepherd lad’ refers to King David,
who I discussed earlier: “He chose David also his servant, and took him from the sheepfolds” (Ps.
78:70).
Milton used an abundance of classical references in his work, including in A Masque, but
they are not to be viewed as equal to Christianity. “The latent antagonism between the Judeo-
Christian worldview and the classical Greek has rarely been so clearly expressed as by Milton’s
Christ in Paradise Regained” (Forsyth 2000, 518). This display of antagonism is the Athens
temptation in Book IV. Christ rejects Satan’s proposition to search for knowledge in Athens as
futile:
he who receives
Light from above, from the fountain of light,
No other doctrine needs, though granted true;
But these are false, or little else but dreams,
Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm. (PR, IV.288-292)
He continues:
who reads
Incessantly, and to his reading brings not
A spirit and judgment equal or superior,
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(And what he brings, what needs he elsewhere seek)
Uncertain and unsettled still remains,
Deep-versed in books and shallow in himself,
Crude or intoxicate, collecting toys,
And trifles for choice matters, worth a sponge;
As children gathering pebbles on the shore.  (PR, IV.322-330)
Leading a purely contemplative life is lacking in its nature. “In rejecting [the Athens temptation],
Christ also rejects a contemplative life as an end: Christ’s aim is to redeem the world, not to live a
morally sinless life, which he might conceivably have done as a philosopher” (Frye 1959, 235-236).
Christianity is of utmost importance for Milton and everything must adhere to the teachings of it.
Only by leading a Christian life, can one be truly free: “the only true freedom [is] the freedom of the
virtuous individual to do of his own free will what he ought to do anyway” (Potter 1978, 71). Even
though this seems paradoxical, human beings (and angels) are free to choose not to obey, even
though they might in the process limit their freedom. Obedience must be freely chosen, otherwise it
is servility (Patrides 1966, 161-162). Free obedience is also connected to the doctrine of grace.
Grace is God’s way of forgiving humanity for original sin. Both the Son in Paradise Regained and
the Lady in A Masque accept grace freely (Patrides 1966, 205) and are thus saved by God unlike
Satan and Comus who have closed their hearts from the grace of God.
2.3.2 Satan
The other main character in Paradise Regained is Satan. John Carey (1999, 160) recognizes that in
the Bible, Satan is a very minor character: “[i]n Christian Doctrine Milton collects all the available
biblical evidence in a few sentences. It amounts to little more than that Satan is the author of all evil
and has various titles.” In Milton’s work, the character of Satan had appeared in Paradise Lost
before being the tempter of the Son in Paradise Regained. Milton’s Satan fell because he was
jealous of God choosing Christ as the Son of God:
Satan, so call him now, his former name
Is heard no more in heaven; he of the first,
If not the first archangel, great in power,
In favour and pre-eminence, yet fraught
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With envy against the Son of God, that day
Honoured by his great Father, and proclaimed
Messiah king anointed, could not bear
Through pride that sight, and thought himself impaired. (PL, V.658-665).
 “This special and isolated origin of Satan within the tradition of Judeo-Christian writings is
scrupulously followed in Milton’s story of the rebellion in which Satan takes his origin” (Forsyth
2000, 526). Even though there is not a lot to go on in the Bible about Satan, the tradition is another
matter. According to this tradition, the origin of the Christian Satan is indeed located in a rebellion
against God. Forsyth (2003, 27) argues that, in Christian tradition, “[t]he figure of Satan exists, not
as embodied evil, but by virtue of his opposition to the hero of the myths, whether god or man.” His
role “in that narrative is to be the Opponent, the Adversary, the one who motivates the plot, who
drives the story into motion” (Forsyth 2003, 26). As Satan cannot be solely seen as the embodiment
of evil in Christianity, how could he be seen as such in Milton? After all, as Stein (1950, 221)
argues, “[o]ne need not choose between Satan’s being a tragic hero or an absurd villain. Either
extreme stamps us as a more restricted moralist than Milton the poet.” Thus we are not limited to
call Satan either evil or good, he can be a mixture of both: not really embodied evil, but certainly
not good.
John Carey (1999, 160) seems to believe that Milton “presents evil as real and traceable to a
single Evil One.” Carey (1999, 160) continues that this “wish to isolate evil in this way argues a
particular mental configuration which seems to be associated with the belief that, once isolated, evil
may become containable or punishable.” This seems like a valid point in general, but his suggestion
that Milton wanted to depict Satan as purely evil is not. Forsyth (2003, 215) states clearly that in
Paradise Lost, Satan “is not himself identical with evil” nor is he “responsible for human evil . . . if
man is free.” Even Carey (1999, 161) notices the flaw in his argument of Satan being evil incarnate:
“Milton’s effort to encapsulate evil in Satan was not successful.” The alleged effort would truly
have been wasted on countless readers who tend to prefer the character of Satan over the character
of God. Carey (1999, 166) notes that “it is the moral evaluation of [Satan’s] actions which generates
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disagreement among readers.” If there is room for different moral evaluations in Milton’s work, it is
unlikely that there has been a serious effort to create a single personification of evil. Satan is in
many ways a human character, and that might have something to do with his appeal. I do agree with
Carey (1999, 172) that “[w]e feel that by suppressing a part of ourselves we can disown and
denounce Satan, but we also feel the power of that part which is having to be suppressed.” This is a
way of forming identities by negating something that one does not want to be a part of one’s
identity, and it is a human tendency. But it also connects with the idea proposed by Carey (1999,
160), that evil may be controlled if isolated: “the urge to locate evil in a single kind of being . . . has
borne fruit throughout history in pogrom, ghetto, and racial massacre.” Ironically, this effort to
control evil, creates even greater evil. Instead of trying to refuse to believe that such evil exists in us
humans, we should try to come to terms with it, even if it means that we must identify with the
character of Satan. After all, according to Milton, we and the angels were created free (CD, 164),
and evil stems from the misuse of that freedom (Danielson 1982, 49).
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3 Kantian Concept of Evil
Immanuel Kant tried to get away from the religious way of thinking through his purely rational
treatment of issues such as morality. For Kant (2002, 60-61) morality stemming from religion is not
desirable, because human beings cannot fathom the all-perfect will of God and thus create only a
reflection of this will which may be very distorted. He wanted to create a system of morality that
was not to be based on interpretations of God’s divine will. Despite his “implacable dismantling of
rational theology” (Ricoeur 1985, 641), he actually came very close to it in some of his concepts.
What then is evil for Kant? In his (1998, 72) opinion “the good and the evil refer, strictly
speaking, to actions, not to the sensuous condition of a particular person.” Or to put it in another
way: evil refers to an act done by a rational being by their own volition (Garcia 2002, 195). It is
moral law that determines whether an act is good or evil (Kant 2002, 75), and we need morality to
give us imperatives by which we can strive to do good acts and avoid evil ones (Kant 1998, 14).
This sounds suspiciously like Christian doctrine I presented earlier, and the similarities do not end
here.
One of these similarities lies within the concept of the Categorical Imperative. This concept
is, according to Johnson (2004), “the fundamental principle of morality.” It is the basic formulation
of morality we can use when making choices, and it is the measuring stick used to determine
whether an act is good or evil. Johnson (2004) argues that the end of an action has no relevance to
the Categorical Imperative; it is simply the act itself that must be applied to the Imperative. Kant
formulated many slightly different versions of the Categorical Imperative, but the basic idea is the
same in everyone: “[a]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it become universal law” (Kant 2002, 37). This entails the idea of the Golden Rule
“do unto others as you would have them do unto you” that has been formulated many times in the
Bible (for example: Lev. 19:18, Matt. 7:12, Luke 6:31, Rom. 13:9). I will now turn to the actual
reasoning behind an act to be qualified as evil.
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3.1 Evil actions
The Kantian view on evil is based on the basic assumption that human beings have something Kant
calls self-love. This self-love is aimed at the general human thought pattern of “pursue that which
pleases me or makes me content, and avoid that which pains me” (Grimm 2002, 168). This self-love
is not seen as totally evil, as it is innate in our species. It is a manifestation of survival instinct. Even
Christianity condoles some small amount of self-love: “thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”
(Lev. 19:18). This phrase is repeated in the Bible (Matt. 19:19, Mark 12:31, Luke 10:27, Rom. 13:9,
Gal. 5:14), so it must be important and true.
Where pure practical reason is concerned, it merely imposes a check upon this love one
has of oneself, declaring it to be something natural, which is active in us even before the
moral law is, the only condition laid down being that there should be agreement with
the said law, the condition prevailing in this case being described as rational self-love.
(Kant 1998, 89)
When this moral law is in contradiction with self-love, the person has to choose which of these
takes priority. As Garcia (2002, 195) explains it: “to call something ‘evil’ . . . means to take some
action as morally wrong, resulting from a direct act of the agent’s will, when she wrongly
subordinates the principle of morality to the principle of self-love.” If moral law is prioritized, an
action is good, but when one places self-love first, an act is perceived as evil.
For Kant there is no middle ground in matters of good and evil: “rigorism . . . involves an
uncompromisingly bivalent view of the moral life, every imputable act and morally responsible
agent, must be characterized as either good or evil” (Allison 2002, 338). Even though I quoted Kant
earlier to state that actions are evil, not people, Allison seems to think that a person committing evil
acts is evil him- or herself. Grimm (2002, 168) shares this view: “[a]ccording to rigorism, a human
being is either morally good or morally evil.” I am a little torn between the two interpretations, but I
will go with Kant’s own writings that only the actions can be classified as evil.
In connection to the origin of evil, Kant argues that human beings possess three
predispositions, which Stephen Grimm (2002, 169) defines as:
a predisposition to animality, which aims at self-preservation, sexual reproduction, and
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community with other human beings; a predisposition to humanity, which prompts
human beings to compare their own worth with the worth of others; and finally a
predisposition to personality, which among other things makes a person capable of
appreciating the moral law.
The predisposition to humanity, “whose governing principle is self-love” (Allison 2002, 339), is the
predisposition where evil stems from. Grimm (2002, 169), on the other hand, argues that the first
two maxims are the ones that give rise to evil: the purely animal instincts humans have are not as
such the root of evil, “but rather the improper priority we grant to these needs and inclinations.”
But, as I hinted earlier in the discussion of physical needs, neither animality nor humanity are in
themselves evil; evil arises only when they are placed above morality. If we focus briefly on the
propensity to humanity, which is the propensity connected with humans comparing themselves to
other humans and considered as at least one of the propensities where evil stems from; one might
assume that it is only through contact with other humans that we do evil. This concept of unsociable
sociability, as Kant calls it, would in a way create evil, since it generates envy and rivalry (Grimm
2002, 166). But it is not the case, rather “[w]e are evil due to the fact that when reason takes shape
in us we subordinate its directives to the inclinations of our animal nature, and when we
subsequently turn to confront our fellow human beings this tendency to favor our own happiness
and pleasure gives rise to a whole new arena for vice” (Grimm 2002, 173). It is not the actual
propensity that creates evil, as all of them are originally good propensities (Allison 2002, 339), it is
only when we begin to develop a sense of the moral law i.e. “when we learn what we ought to be
doing (obeying the moral law), our natural needs and inclinations . . . suddenly take on a rebellious
and, for the first time, an evil role” (Grimm 2002, 171). Kant argues (as does Christianity) that we
do, in fact, make a rational choice between moral law and self-love and that this choice has to be
entirely free to make moral judgments on these decisions.
3.1.1 Free Will
For Kant (1996, 13), will is the choice of action a rational agent takes when he or she wants
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something. As I stated earlier, Kant (1996, 149) is a firm believer in the freedom of the will:
“[e]very action . . . has its end; and since no one can have an end without himself making the object
of his choice into an end, to have any end of action whatsoever is an act of freedom on the part of
the acting subject.” And as moral law is not a law forced by some external entity, its limiting quality
for this choice of action must be internal, i.e. a self-constraint that does not affect the freedom of the
agent’s will (Kant 1996, 145). Even though human beings are “forced” to subordinate self-love to
moral law in order to be good, they are free: they can either conform to the requirements of moral
law, or embrace the evil inclination of self-love. As with the Christian Free Will Defense, Kant also
requires an act to be chosen freely for it to be considered as morally evil or morally good (Grimm
2002, 161), as the “locus of both moral goodness and evil must lie in the will” (Allison 2002, 338).
As I have hinted, although Kant sees human choice of as being free, he also thinks that all human
beings are, in some way, morally flawed. This concept is called radical evil.
3.1.2 Radical Evil
The basic idea of radical evil is that people, in some point of their development, choose to
subordinate moral law to self-love. This action can also be referred to as adopting an evil maxim.
“A rule that the agent himself makes his principle on subjective grounds is called his maxim; hence
different agents can have very different maxims with regard to the same law” (Kant 1996, 17). Kant
entertains a possibility that there might be a chance for a human being to adopt a good maxim, but
“one and all, our wills opt for the evil maxim” (Grimm 2002, 163). Kant also argues that, although
the evil maxim we all choose is present at birth, we are not born evil; the time related to the
choosing is rational, not temporal (Grimm 2002, 163). But how can all human beings adopt the evil
maxim? One explanation to it, according to Stephen R. Grimm (2002, 168), is that the human being
“was naturally inclined to act primarily out of a concern for his own happiness.” Grimm (2002,
168) continues: “[t]he moment that we fail to act according to a subjective maxim committed to the
moral law, [Kant] argues, we do not become slightly less good, as if we just temporarily lapsed
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from the good maxim; rather, what this lapse shows is that we were never committed to the moral
law to begin with”. Thus, since we all are looking out for ourselves, we all adopt an evil maxim.
Allison (2002, 342) makes a claim that human beings are incapable of adopting a good maxim, but
“[t]his does not mean that Kant thought it impossible to subordinate self-love to duty, . . . only that
we cannot do so spontaneously, without, as it were, giving self-love a hearing.” This process of the
original adoption of the evil maxim is what Kant calls radical evil, and “like its theological
analogue, original sin, must be thought as resulting from an originary use of freedom” (Allison
2002, 343). By the term radical evil, Kant does not mean some sort of extraordinary evil, but “uses
the term radical in the etymological sense to indicate the root of all moral evil” (Allison 2002, 344).
“Kant’s doctrine of radical evil – which holds that human beings, as a species, possess an innate
propensity to evil” can be seen as “Kant’s apparent endorsement of the Christian view of original
sin” (Grimm 2002, 160). So, as with Christianity, the human species is somehow doomed to do evil.
One thing that Kant is criticized of is that his theory of evil does not account for heinous acts of
evil, such as the Holocaust (Allison 2002, 344). I will now turn my attention to Hannah Arendt, who
utilizes Kantian philosophy to make sense of these horrible acts of evil.
3.1.3 Hannah Arendt
Like Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt did not think that there are people who are purely evil, but she
did note that human beings are capable of extremely atrocious acts i.e. radical evil (Birmingham
2003, 82). It must be clarified that the term radical evil had different meanings for Kant and Arendt;
whereas Kant used it to denote “original evil” Arendt uses the term to signify extraordinary evil:
Arendt understands radical evil as the attempt to eliminate spontaneity from the human
race; it is the attempt to reshape human nature itself by doing away with the very
unpredictability that lies at the root of human freedom and action; it is the attempt to
stabilize human behaviour in order to allow the law of history or the law of nature to
progress. (Birmingham 2003, 87)
Even though there is this fundamental difference in the concept of radical evil, the concept of evil
itself seems to be roughly the same: “The hell of radical evil lies in the refusal of symbolic
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transcendence, represented by religious and moral limits, substituting instead the fantasies of
immanent ideologies and omnipotent dreams” (Birmingham 2003, 84-5). Like Kant, Arendt sees
substituting moral law with selfishness as evil. In Kant’s view, evil is an action where moral law is
given the subordinate role compared to self-love; Arendt claims that radical evil is when a person
replaces the moral law with his or her ideology, thus creating a sense of omnipotence. But this
apparent difference in interpretation, is really not as huge as it first seems: both Kant and Arendt see
radical evil as subordination of moral law.
When Hannah Arendt was at the trial of Adolf Eichmann, she was shocked to hear
Eichmann claim that he had lived according to Kantian moral law (Birmingham 2003, 85). Peg
Birmingham (2003, 85) continues to report this encounter: “Upon further examination, however,
Arendt grasps that what Eichmann actually did was to pervert the Kantian law, substituting the will
of Hitler for the universal and transcendent law of reason.” Thus the Third Reich had taken the
Kantian Categorical Imperative and replaced it with an ideology. When one replaces moral law with
some ideology, there still remains the predisposition of humanity, and the self-love it entails. In
situations like Germany during the reign of Hitler, a person would logically consider it preferable –
in order to protect one’s sanity – to refrain from killing. Thus the new moral law would have to
compete with this temptation to do good (Birmingham 2003, 85). In Eichmann’s case, according to
him, it was Heinrich Himmler who by “winged words” - the twisted reasoning of why the heinous
acts were actually necessary – distorted Eichmann’s desires to match the desires of Hitler, thus
turning feelings of pity for the innocent people being murdered into self-pity (Birmingham 2003,
86).
The things that had happened in the world during the 20th Century, inspired tremendous fear
in Hannah Arendt (Birmingham 2003, 82). This fear rises from the fact that human beings are
capable of evil. In Arendt’s view, these were ordinary people who were responsible for the horrible
events that took place (Birmingham 2003, 82). Thus, there are no human beings born simply evil,
who then would be solely responsible for diabolical evil. This can only mean that all human beings
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are capable of this, and thus even horribly disturbing evil is banal.
One last piece of theory I want to present before I turn my attention to the actual texts I will
be analyzing, is Ernesto V. Garcia’s (2002, 202) definitions of four fundamental types of evil:
“indifference to the destruction of the humanity of another person”, “denial of the humanity of
another person”, “servility, or depreciation of one’s own humanity”, and “delight in suffering of the
humanity of another person.” For the first type, Garcia (2002, 202) uses Arendt’s description of
Eichmann’s trial as his example: Eichmann stated that he was only obeying orders. Eichmann was
responsible for the deaths of millions of people by being in charge of transporting them to death
camps, but he did not admit to being guilty because he did what Hitler had ordered him to do. The
example of the second type Garcia (2002, 202-203) gives is racism. With racist behavior the
humanity of another person is demeaned by the racist, as he or she refuses to see the other person as
equally human as he or she is. The third and fourth types are opposites of each other in some way:
[w]hile servility involves depreciating or attaching a kind of negative value to one’s
own humanity, while attaching a positive value to the humanity of our superior . . . , in
cases of delighting in the suffering of others, such as cruel cases of torture, we now
attach a positive value to our own humanity . . . and take pleasure in depreciating or
attaching a kind of negative value to the humanity of another person. (Garcia 2002, 203)
I have presented these types of evil as Garcia uses both Kant and Arendt to define what evil is.
These types are present in John Milton’s A Masque. A fitting example of the first type might be the
fact that the people Comus has turned into monsters keep enjoying themselves even though they see
the Lady captured. As for the second type, there seems to be a problem: is Comus human? The fact
that no character seems to give him any human rights shows that his humanity is downplayed in the
masque itself. But Comus is a rational being, and for the time being, that will suffice as the
definition of humanity, thus the fact that the masque itself denies his humanity is an example of the
second type of evil. Garcia does not give examples of the third type; he only presents it as being the
opposite of the fourth type, which could be for example, torture. To bring up the “monstrous rout”
of Comus again, they are the perfect example of someone downgrading their own humanity: they
choose to stay under the control of the person who turned them into monsters, thus denying their
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own humanity. An example of the fourth type in A Masque is obviously Comus himself who has
bound the Lady to the chair without showing any kind of pity. I will now turn my full attention to
the Kantian analysis of the two texts by John Milton.
3.2 Good in Evil, Evil in Good
Roy Flannagan (1989, 28) compares A Masque to Milton’s other works: “Like Paradise Regained .
. . , Comus has as one of its major themes the passive resistance of good people to evil ideas, and
like all of Milton’s major works it focuses on the process of temptation.” They both do deal with
temptation and overcoming evil by patience. The characters of the Lady and Comus can be seen as
forerunners of the characters in Milton’s epics; “Comus is obviously the spiritual ancestor of Satan”
in Paradise Lost and “the Lady is an obvious ancestor of Jesus in Paradise Regained; both are fixed
in one spot and tempted passively” (Flannagan 1989, 28). Satan in Paradise Lost is, in some way,
the same as Satan in Paradise Regained. I argue this because the beginning of Paradise Regained
refers back to Paradise Lost and the narrator claims to be the same one as in the previous epic:
I who erewhile the happy garden sung,
By one man’s disobedience lost, now sing
Recovered Paradise to all mankind (PR, I.1-3)
Obviously Satan has developed as a character between the two poems, but essentially he is still the
same. Frye (1956, 234) notes that the evil characters in Paradise Regained and A Masque seem to
get the spotlight:
Comus and Satan get our dramatic attention because they show such energy and
resourcefulness; the tempted figures are either motionless or unmoved and have only
the ungracious dramatic function of saying No. Yet, of course, the real relation is the
opposite of the apparent one: the real source of life and freedom and energy is in the
frigid figure at the center.
This inactive refusal is exactly the way to victory by muting the opponent (Goldsmith 1987, 130).
In Paradise Regained there are at least two instances where Satan is rendered mute by the Son:
Satan stood
A while as mute confounded what to say,
What to reply (III.1-3)
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and “Satan had not to answer, but stood struck / With guilt of his own sin” (III.146-7). Comus is not
so much speechless as he is frustrated with his failure to win the argument against the Lady: “Come,
no more, / This is mere moral babble” (A Masque, 805-806). Comus also recognizes that the Lady is
winning the argument:
She fables not, I feel that I do fear
Her words set off by some superior power;
And though not mortal, yet a cold shuddering dew
Dips me all o’er, as when the wrath of Jove
Speaks thunder, and the chains of Erebus
To some of Saturn’s crew. (A Masque, 709-804)
According to Flannagan (1989, 30) “[t]he two opposing central images [in the masque] are
those of light, embodied in the Lady, and darkness, in Comus.” He (1989, 32) argues that even
though “the reader of the masque can quickly see that there is a battle going on between Light and
Darkness . . . the images of Vice or Virtue are complicated by the appearance of good in evil and
evil in good.” One of these instances is the point when Comus is depicted as having positive
feelings. When Comus first sees the Lady, he is immediately taken by her singing, and proclaims:
But such a sacred, and home-felt delight,
Such sober certainty of waking bliss,
I never heard till now. I’ll speak to her
And she shall be my queen (A Masque, 261-264).
The reader is given the impression that Comus falls in love. He is obviously smitten since he wants
to make her his queen, his partner. This seems odd as love is normally perceived as a positive
feeling and somewhat a sign of capacity to compassion, so how is it possible that a supposedly evil
character can fall in love? And Comus is not the only evil character in Milton’s work to be thus
temporarily rendered good. After seeing Eve and her beauty Satan is struck by positive emotions:
the evil one abstracted stood
From his own evil, and for the time remained
Stupidly good, of enmity disarmed,
Of guile, of hate, of envy, of revenge” (PL, IX.463-466).
Satan falls in love, just like Comus did. Being capable of these positive feelings must mean
something, because falling in love is described as being completely separated from all evil desires.
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“The antagonist is endowed with full personality so that we may experience his conflict with moral
law. It is his inner conflict; the acute self-consciousness, the complete ignorance, and the shifting
degrees of both; it is the symbolic relationship of good and evil – these give Satan’s rôle its
meaning” (Stein 1950, 230). But even if he is capable of good, he still chooses to tempt Eve:
She fair, divinely fair, fit love for gods,
Not terrible, though terror be in love
And beauty, not approached by stronger hate,
Hate stronger, under show of love well feigned,
The way which to her ruin now I tend. (PL, IX.489-493)
Comus and Satan have a lot in common: not only are they both antagonists, they are both
essentially tempters. Both can also be seen as ambivalent characters, who do not fit in with a notion
of a completely evil character. Like Satan, Comus does do evil deeds, but the question whether
good intentions make a difference remains somewhat unsolved.
But does the intention behind an act matter? The short answer is no. In his discussion about
the Categorical Imperative, Johnson (2004) claims that Kant dismisses the importance of the intent
behind an act. If this is the case, then the fact that Comus is in love makes no difference. He does
choose to fool the Lady by disguising himself and bind her to a chair in order to tempt her into
drinking the potion that will turn her into a monster; it does not seem that the actions are any less
evil. Love cannot be a reason for doing a morally erroneous choice. It might make it more
understandable, but a person cannot value one life higher than another. If that would be the case,
how could we decide who is more valuable? Almost all human beings are someone’s daughters,
sons, sisters or brothers. Or is it that if you do not have a family, you are considered of having less
worth than someone who has children? Are we really ready to make this into a universal law? And
what about the Brothers in the masque? Are we really any more prepared to deem everyone evil,
who has ever done questionable things for love? The Attendant Spirit tells the Brothers to take the
magic wand away from Comus when they are about to rescue the Lady. He actually instructs them
twice; first by warning not to use brute force, since it does not good:
Alas good venturous youth,
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I love thy courage yet, and bold emprise,
But here thy sword can do thee little stead,
Far other arms, and other weapons must
Be those that quell the might of hellish charms. (A Masque, 608-612)
The second time he clearly states that they have to take the wand instead even if
he and his cursed crew
Fierce sign of battle make, and menace high,
Or like the sons of Vulcan vomit smoke. (A Masque, 652-654)
When the time comes, the Brothers lunge straight at Comus with their swords drawn and he escapes
with the wand. They are of course motivated by the love for their sister, just like Comus is. They
should have had temperance and done as they were instructed. Of course, they did not know what
was going to happen when they did not follow the orders, but they still made a choice to break the
rules. So, neither Comus nor the Brothers are totally evil, but the actions are; it follows that Comus
is not the only one doing bad things in the masque. I deem the act of the Brothers as evil because
the one done by Comus cannot be anything but evil, he holds the Lady imprisoned, and I most
certainly am not ready to make judgments on shades of gray. If we are to make public judgments,
we must have some objective, clear-cut way of looking at things.
So following the logic of Kant’s rigoristic analysis, there does not seem to be any way
to avoid the conclusion that a benign sympathetic person (who gives the incentive of
sympathy priority over the moral law in his maxim), Hitler, and even Eichmann (whose
maxims presumably did not give priority to respect for the moral law) are all morally
evil. (Bernstein 2001, 62).
My intention is to question the black-and-white picture of Comus as evil, not to completely
deny that he commits evil acts – he most certainly does. A few cases of evil acts by Kantian
standards arise from the masque. For example, Comus chooses self-love over moral code – or
jollities over morality – in his first speech:
What hath night to do with sleep?
Night hath better sweets to prove,
Venus now wakes, and wakens Love. (A Masque, 122-124)
He also makes insinuations to pagan rites on the following lines, thus presenting himself as opposed
to religious code. Before Comus hears the Lady, he is portrayed as plotting against the humanity of
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another person:
I under fair pretence of friendly ends,
And well-placed words of glozing courtesy
Baited with reasons not unplausible
Wind me into the easy-hearted man,
And hug him into snares. (A Masque, 160-164)
The Lady proves to be quite capable of standing up for herself and she even confronts Comus and
his dehumanization:
Hast thou betrayed my credulous innocence
With vizored falsehood, and base forgery,
And wouldst thou seek again to trap me here
With liquorish baits fit to ensnare a brute? (A Masque, 696-699)
If this is the reaction to someone lying and deceiving, how can the lying of someone else be a good
thing? An interesting case of this is the one of the Attendant Spirit. He is sent by God to aid the
children on their perilous journey, but he must for some unknown reason disguise himself before he
lets the humans see him. This is exactly what Comus does when he meets the Lady; the only
distinction is that the two have different motives. Again the question about intention rises, but since
the matter is clear when we follow Kant’s Categorical Imperative, there is no logical way of
deeming this to be a desired universal rule of “lie and deceive when you feel it is necessary.” We
can see that again the actions are evil, not Comus nor the Attendant Spirit. It is emotionally hard,
though, to actually accept that the motivation behind an action really does not matter. But if we
pursue the analysis with Kantian rigorism, we must admit that this really is the case. A lie is a lie.
“Both Comus and the Attendant Spirit look like innocent shepherds, both tell lies that sound like
truth. How can you know the good lies from the bad ones?” (Orgel 2003, 35). The heavenly
guardian is beginning to look a lot like the evil sorcerer. Orgel (2003, 34-35) raises further problems
with the Attendant Spirit, who
is not around when you get lost, has difficulty finding you himself, warns the boys
about Comus but not their sister (who is the one who needs the warning and could profit
by it); and though he is in charge of the rescue operation is unaccountably not there
when it happens, so the boys muff it by driving Comus and his minions off but not
seizing his wand. The Lady still is not free, and the Attendant Spirit blames the boys –
he told them to seize the wand – and they are too well mannered to ask him where he
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was when the action started.
He might not be blamed for the eagerness of the boys, he actually instructs them twice, but when
the time comes, the Brothers lunge straight at Comus with their swords drawn and he escapes with
the wand. To their defense, they love the Lady and want to rescue her as soon as possible, but the
reason behind an evil action does not in any way change the act into good – not even if you are a
guardian from Heaven and have to fool the children you are protecting into thinking that you are a
shepherd. Orgel (2003, 38) notes that this is exactly what the poet had in mind: “Milton’s masque is
precisely about how complicated the choice of virtue is as soon as it stops being treated as an
abstract question.” The Attendant Spirit displays alarmingly poor judgment as well as somewhat
failing in his job to protect the innocent. When he finds the Brothers, he tells how he knows what
has happened to the Lady:
Too well I did perceive it was the voice
Of my most honoured Lady, your dear sister.
Amazed I stood, harrowed with grief and fear,
And O poor hapless nightingale thought I,
How sweet thou sing’st, how near the deadly snare!
Then down the lawns I ran with headlong haste
Through paths, and turnings often trod by day,
Till guided by mine ear I found the place
Where that damned wizard hid in sly disguise
(For so by certain signs I knew) had met
Already, ere my best speed could prevent,
The aidless innocent Lady his wished prey,
Who gently asked if he had seen such two,
Supposing him some neighbour villager. (A Masque, 562-575)
After hiding out for a while, the Attendant Spirit skulks off to find the Brothers to go and save the
Lady. If he is sent from Heaven to protect those who God wants to keep safe, how is it possible that
he does not actually protect those people? Why does he send two adolescent boys to fight against a
powerful wizard? Even if he wanted to remain in his disguise, he could have swooped in dressed as
a shepherd and just talked his way out of the situation. He makes a conscious choice to leave the
one person he is sent to protect to fend for herself and gets the Brothers to do the actual saving, or at
least make an attempt at it. This choice is costly to the Lady, as she is bound to the chair and must
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endure Comus’s temptations. The Attendant Spirit’s goodness is not to be taken for granted.
Both A Masque and Paradise Regained highlight the power of words, and, of course, truth.
Victory is achieved by overturning lies with undeniable truth. In both texts the antagonists use the
same kind of “winged words” Eichmann claimed Himmler used to distort the reasoning behind the
choice to murder millions of innocent people. Unlike Eichmann, the protagonists in A Masque and
Paradise Regained do see behind the false logic. The Lady is furious at Comus for twisting the
truth:
but that this juggler
Would think to charm my judgement, as mine eyes
Obtruding false rules pranked in reason’s garb (A Masque, 756-758)
This echoes the Son’s retort to Satan when he tries to make himself pitiful by stating “‘Tis true, I am
that spirit unfortunate” (PR, I.358) and making a long speech about how he has been wrongly
labeled evil. The Son replies:
that hath been thy craft,
By mixing somewhat true to vent more lies.
But what have been thy answers, what but dark
Ambiguous and with double sense deluding (PR, I.432-435)
It is hard to not to be fooled sometimes when there is a seed of truth behind the lie. This is exactly
the mixture on good within evil intentions I mentioned earlier; it makes the tempter seem
ambivalent instead of creating an image of a totally evil character. They do know good, they just
choose to twist it to make the choice a little more difficult for the protagonist.
If we examine whether or not the characters in the masque have adopted an evil maxim, we
find out something interesting. Comus obviously has adopted such a maxim, as he has captured the
Lady and is trying to entice her into drinking his strange potion. But the fascinating thing lies in the
fact that, although Comus is responsible for the seduction of the people that have turned into
monsters, they themselves are to blame for their present state, as they
boast themselves more comely than before
And all their friends, and native home forget
To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty (A Masque, 75-77)
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and do not seek salvation. Thus they have freely chosen to embrace their newly formed state and
enjoy the life Comus provides for them under his service. As I stated earlier, servility is frowned
upon in Kantian philosophy: “[b]ut one who makes himself a worm cannot complain afterwards if
people step on him” (Kant 1996, 188). But why do these people stay under Comus’s influence?
Why do they not try to get away from servility? At least part of the answer might lie in the fact that
they are enjoying themselves. Comus tries to get the Lady to appreciate the pleasures in life:
Why are you vexed Lady? why do you frown?
Here dwell no frowns, nor anger, from these gates
Sorrow flies far: see, here be all the pleasures
That fancy can beget on youthful thoughts. (A Masque, 665-668)
It is not so strange that the rabble does not want to leave, if their life is like this. They consciously
choose to heed to their self-love and brush morality aside.
3.3 Sympathy for the Devil
Like the Book of Job and A Masque, Paradise Regained deals with temptation. Satan is the person
doing the tempting, but he operates with the permission of God: God says
this man born and now upgrown,
To show him worthy of his birth divine
And high prediction, henceforth I expose
To Satan; let him tempt (PR, I.140-143)
Satan, although doing the tempting willingly, “must be a reluctant agent of the will of God” (Frye
1956, 230) – or as Milton (PR, I.126-128) puts it:
unweeting he fulfilled
The purposed counsel pre-ordained and fixed
Of the most High.
I do not really wish to go into the problem of predestination in detail, but as I pointed out earlier,
Milton seems to refute predestination (CD, 164). Dennis Danielson (1999, 150-152) is much more
concerned with this issue, since he wishes to explain how free will exists and predestination does
not. Danielson (1999, 151) argues that “for Milton . . . God’s foreknowledge is no more indicative
of any kind of determinism than is that certainty which an event proves to have once it becomes fait
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accompli.” One can argue that “The purposed counsel pre-ordained and fixed” in the quote from
Paradise Regained suggests some form of determinism, but as I quoted earlier Milton (CD, 164)
believes that “nothing happens because God has foreseen it, but rather he has foreseen each event
because each is the result of particular causes which, by his decree, work quite freely and with
which he is thoroughly familiar.” So God decrees free will and at the same time sees how it affects
what takes place after this decree. This omniscience of God creates an illusion of determinism.
Even though Satan is obviously evil in the poem, he cannot be viewed as evil personified.
I came among the Sons of God, when he
Gave up into my hands Uzzean Job
To prove him, and illustrate his high worth;
And when to all his Angels he proposed
To draw the proud King Ahab into fraud
That he might fall in Ramoth, they demurring,
I undertook that office, and the tongues
Of all his flattering Prophets glibbed with lies
To his destruction, as I had in charge.
For what he bids I do; though I have lost
Much lustre of my native brightness, lost
To be beloved of God, I have not lost
To love, at least contemplate and admire
What I see excellent in good, or fair,
Or virtuous, I should so have lost all sense. (PR, I.368-382)
He is still clinging to remnants of his former being and has not lost the ability to admire the good
and the beautiful. He is also painfully aware of the fact that when he tempted Job, he was being
used by God as a tool to test Job’s faith. Even if Satan is doing what God wanted him to do, he still
chose freely to inflict pain upon Job, as the Son points out:
Wilt thou impute to obedience what thy fear
Extorts, or pleasure to do ill excites?
What but thy malice moved thee to misdeem
Of righteous Job, then cruelly to afflict him
With all inflictions? But his patience won? (PR, I.422-426)
You cannot blame God for the choices you make if you believe in free will.
I addressed the subject of God’s responsibility for evil in the chapter on Christianity and I
will now return to the subject briefly. Although Christianity teaches that God the Father, God the
Son and God the Holy Spirit are essentially one God, in Milton’s epics God the Father and God the
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Son are separate characters. I will not go into the debate about whether or not Milton believed in the
Holy Trinity as Christianity teaches8, but it has to be noted that in the Christian Doctrine (1973,
264) he very clearly states his opinion:”[i]f Father and Son were of one essence, which because of
their relationship, is impossible, it would follow that the Father was the Son’s son and the Son the
Father’s father. Anyone who is not a lunatic can see what kind of a conclusion this is.”9 I will now
present the different types of God present in Milton’s Paradise Regained.
Earlier I quoted Paradise Lost (V.117-119)
Evil into the mind of god or man
May come and go, so unapproved, and leave
No spot or blame behind
stating that sin requires volition. I still stand behind this claim, but if we were to examine the quote
more closely, we will notice that the mind of God might not be as pure as we would hope: Michael
Bryson (2002, 87) calls this “a disturbingly thin thread upon which to hang the idea that one’s
creator is wholly good.” I would like to note that in Paradise Lost, only the capitalized word ‘God’
refers to the Father and otherwise it is taken to mean the angels. I still wanted to add Bryson’s point
here because it is possible to read the character of Father as somewhat evil. As I hinted earlier, in
the Christian Doctrine “Milton insists on God’s goodness, but he does so by explicitly entertaining
and rejecting hypotheses that produce an unjust God. He admits the theoretical possibility of an evil
God and therefore implies a standard of values that transcends God’s will” (Slotkin 2004, 102). In
the Old Testament, God even repents what he was going to do to his people: when the chosen
people have made a golden calf to worship and God becomes enraged, Moses scolds God for
planning to wipe them from the earth – and it actually works: “And the LORD repented of the evil
which he thought to do unto his people” (Ex. 32:14)10. God feels remorse for his thoughts.
8 This debate over Milton’s belief in the Trinity remains unsolved. The disbelief side of the argument was very heavily
based on the Christian Doctrine, but the authorship of it was under heavy debate. After a lot of discussions about the
authorship, it is mostly agreed on that it is actually Milton’s work. See footnote on page 5.
9 Milton has been called an Arian mainly because of this view on the Trinity. Arianism teaches that God created Jesus
and thus Jesus cannot be considered as equal to God (Webster’s 1999, 67). This belief system appeared first in
Alexandria in the 3rd and 4th Centuries and derives the name from the priest who taught it, Arius. Arianism was
declared as heretical by the first Nicene Council in 325 (Webster’s 1999, 769).
10 It has to be noted that the word ‘evil’ in the quotation from the Bible might refer to the unpleasantness of
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Intending is, of course, not the same as acting. If we would punish people for intention alone, there
would not be people left on this earth who were not guilty of thinking of doing an evil deed. This
problem arises from time to time in the discourse of crime and punishment. Most recently it has
been present in the War on Terror the United States are waging against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations. Can we truly punish people for intent alone? How do we measure what is an intent
that would have led to action? Or are we prepared to wait for a person to commit heinous crimes
before we interfere? Usually the problem has been solved by punishing intent when the person has
taken some steps to actualize his intention, but this is not a clear-cut case either. Does it count as a
step when a terrorist has taken flying lessons? Or when he or she has made internet searches on
how to make bombs? These are questions that will never be answered fully, because of the
subjective nature of the evaluation process and the changing moral norms in society, but this does
not mean that discussing them is futile. Milton draws on the tradition of a temperamental God in the
Old Testament: “Milton creates a passible and morally ambiguous character in the Father, a
character with the rich personality of Yahweh as a model” (Bryson 2002, 91). The Old Testament
God, or Yahweh, is the one who claims he has created everything, including evil (Isa. 45:7). Slotkin
(2004, 119) defines this problem of God’s responsibility for evil in the following manner:
God’s relationship to evil is something like that of a theatrical director. He shapes the
sinful wills of his creations to bring forth particular forms of evil action. From those
actions, or directly from himself, he produces punishments that are constructed
according to sinister principles. These punishments serve as allegories, rendering
abstract moral lessons in a concrete, sensual, and symbolic form.
God incites sin and punishes them without any moral dilemmas. I am in no way suggesting that
punishment is wrong, it is certainly needed in a law-abiding society. It is a way of making sure, or at
least attempting to make sure, that people follow the rules. I am merely suggesting that God first
inciting something and then punishing the person who was helpless before his inciting, might not be
morally acceptable. Although, as I stated earlier, Milton (CD, 331-332) argues that this inciting can
punishment. This does not really demean my analysis, since what I am claiming is, that God has a conscience which
does not always agree with the actions he takes or considers taking, not that God is evil in the demonic sense. And
since Moses manages to change God’s mind, the action God was about to take must be immoral as he reconsidered
the matter.
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only be done to human beings who already are on the verge of sinning, it still seems like a
disturbing image of God pushing a sinner over the cliff, it only makes God seem petty, mean, and
vindictive. And punishment in itself is a problematic subject. How do we limit the punishment only
to the person who is guilty of a crime? If someone steals a car and is sent to prison, his family will
bear a certain amount of suffering as well. The incarcerated person might be the one providing for
the family and now they are left suddenly without the means to survive with no fault of their own.
There is also the emotional suffering the family has to go through, and this is not by any means
insignificant. In the Book of Job, the first trial he has to go through is that his livestock is stolen, his
servants either captured or dead, and his sons and daughters have been killed (Job 1:14-19). The
trial is on Job, but his sons, daughters, servants, and livestock have to bear an even heavier burden.
And all this is done so Yahweh can prove to Satan that Job is his loyal servant. It would not be
unreasonable to wish for a more efficient solution to the situation. But in Paradise Regained, the
Father has not reconsidered the need for trials of faith. When he speaks about letting Satan tempt his
son, he is described as smiling (PR, I.129). Of course the Father is certain that the Son is going to
win, but I do not think he should be smiling at the prospect of his son being tormented by Satan, nor
is it recommendable behavior to exhibit schadenfreude at the expense of Satan. The character of
God is not pleasant in the Old Testament nor is he in Paradise Regained.
Luckily we have a champion on our side against a morally ambiguous God: “the Son . . .
fights – through reason, self-sacrifice, and self-denial – to overturn heavenly kingship, to refuse
thrones both earthly and heavenly, and to abolish kingship itself by reclaiming a Miltonic, internal
definition of glory, heroism, and true government” (Bryson 2002, 89). The Son offers himself freely
as ransom for the salvation of men:
Behold me then, me for him, life for life
I offer, on me let thine anger fall;
Account me man; I for his sake will leave
Thy bosom, and this glory next to thee
Freely put off, and for him lastly die (PL, III.236-240).
As he sacrifices himself, he is sent on earth in a human form to die for the sins of Adam and Eve.
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This display of grace makes the character of the Son a much more likeable character than the
Father. Paradise Regained begins with an invocation, as is customary in the genre of the epic:
Thou Spirit who led’st this glorious eremite
Into the desert, his victorious field
Against the spiritual foe, and brought’st him thence
By proof the undoubted Son of God, inspire,
As thou art wont, my prompted song else mute,
And bear through highth or depth of nature’s bounds,
With prosperous wing full summed to tell of deeds
Above heroic, though in secret done,
And unrecorded left through many an age,
Worthy t’ have not remained so long unsung. (PR, I.8-17)
The Son is praised as being “glorious” and doing “deeds above heroic,” but it seems that regarding
the plot, the Son is fairly passive. He refuses Satan’s enticements by resorting to rhetoric. But this is
actually what true heroism is: displaying virtue in the face of temptation. “Virtue is the strength of
human being’s maxims in fulfilling his duty. . . . Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the
obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which
can come into conflict with the human being’s moral resolution” (Kant 1996, 156). Even though
refusing Satan’s temptations seems to be easy for the Son, the matter might not be as simple as that;
the Son has had his moments of uncertainty. It is not clear to him what he is supposed to do when he
enters the desert:
Musing and much revolving in his breast,
How best the mighty work he might begin
Of saviour to mankind, and which way first (PR, I.185-187)
This lack of clarity results from being cut off from the immediate presence of God as a result of
original sin all humans share, but the Son is open to God’s providence and eventually finds his way:
now by some strong motion I am led
Into this wilderness, to what intent
I learn not yet, perhaps I need not know;
For what concerns my knowledge God reveals. (PR, I.290-293)
These instances of original sin being present in the brief epic, which may also be seen as instances
of Kantian radical evil, as the concepts are so closely related. Another instance of this is present in
the way Jesus has not been above hopes of doing aggressively heroic deeds:
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victorious deeds
Flamed in my heart, heroic acts, one while
To rescue Israel from the Roman yoke,
Then to subdue and quell o’er all the earth
Brute violence and proud tyrannic power,
Till truth were freed, and equity restored:
Yet held it more humane, more heavenly first
By winning words to conquer willing hearts,
And make persuasion do the work of fear. (PR, I.215-223)
Jesus is unable “to subordinate self-love to duty, . . . spontaneously, without, as it were, giving self-
love a hearing” (Allison 2002, 342), though he does manage to choose to do the right thing in the
end. If the Son had given in to his urges, his story would have been completely different. One could
imagine that he would share the faith of Solomon, David, or Samson, who were all once champions
of faith, next punished because for displeasing God. All of their downfalls can be accounted to be
caused by women: Solomon’s concubines worshiped their own gods, David committed adultery and
Samson was deceived by Delilah. It seems like the temptation that was discussed earlier, where
Belial suggested that Satan “Set women in his eye and in his walk, / Among daughters of men the
fairest found” (PR, II.153-154) is not so far-fetched as one might first assume.
Despite their apparent dissimilarities, the Son and Satan do share certain aspects, as Milton
gives the role of “equivalent or narrative double of the Son” to Satan (Forsyth 2003, 13). I have
already drawn attention to the matter of the morning star used to refer to the Son and Satan (and
Comus) alike, but there are further examples of this doubling, for example in Satan’s speech:
I among the rest,
Though not to be baptized, by voice from heaven
Heard thee pronounced the Son of God beloved.
Thenceforth I thought thee worth my nearer view
And narrower scrutiny, that I might learn
In what degree or meaning thou art called
The Son of God, which bears no single sense;
The Son of God I also am, or was,
And if I was, I am; relation stands;
All men are Sons of God. (PR, IV.511-520)
Satan argues that even though the Son is called the Son of God, it might mean only that he is
human, and “Satan is indeed quite right to say that the phrase ‘Son of God’ bears no single sense”
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(Forsyth 2003, 179). The humanity of both characters is also noted by Nancy Rosenfeld (2008,
122); she also raises the issue of Lucifer as the morning star, and how this image is connected with
both the Son and Satan and concludes: “[t]he poet chooses to emphasize a similarity between Satan
and Christ just as he is about to portray them both as humans.” The passage she refers to is in the
first Book of Paradise Regained where Satan and the Son meet for the first time. Satan is described
as “an aged man in rural weeds” (PR, I.314) searching for lost sheep or gathering sticks for
firewood. Incidentally, Jesus describes himself in the Bible as a vine with people as his branches
that do not survive without him: “If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is
withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned” (John 15:6). There
is also the well-known reference to Jesus as the Good Shepherd (for example, Ps.23 which begins:
“The LORD is my shepherd”) and fallen people as lost sheep (Jer. 50:6, Matt. 10:6, Luke 15:4).
Satan can therefore be argued to be roaming the desert collecting souls of sinners as he goes.
Satan sees the Son as human: “For that to me thou seem’st the man” (PR, I.327). When
Satan first discovers the Son at his baptism, he goes straight to his council of fallen angels to
propose the best course of action. The fallen angels decide to send Satan “their great dictator” (PR,
I.113) to tempt the Son.
Milton seems to have been directed by two main ideas. The first is that the Son who is a
human should be tempted by an opponent who also bears the character of a man. The
second is that the Son’s stance as an individual man, one who has not yet accepted
leadership role similar to that which he had so easily undertaken in the battle against the
fallen angels . . . , a young man struggling alone with issues of individual identity,
should be counterpoised by an antagonist who is the leader of a group. (Rosenfeld 2008,
81)
All humans have faced the difficult decision between doing what is morally righteous and doing
whatever they want and are aware of the immense perplexity of emotion one has to face in such a
situation. Peer pressure is a very influential thing as we are social beings. But why is evil so
enticing? Simply because humans are selfish, we want things that give us pleasure. To err is human.
This is just what Milton utilizes in the temptations of his evil characters.
The lush enticements of Comus, the fine heroic speeches of Satan in Paradise Lost and
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his even more moving weariness and despair in Paradise Regained . . . – all of these
may be designed to enhance our admiration for the characters who successfully resist
such temptations, but they also force us to make a choice between good and evil and to
recognize that this choice is much harder for us than for Milton’s heroes. (Potter 1978,
74)
Satan’s free will has caused his fall, as it caused the fall of Adam and Eve. The same free
will enables human beings to place self-love over morality again and again. Rosenfeld (2008, 2)
argues that the character of Satan in Paradise Regained “is indeed characterized by his humanity:
the character is no longer an archangel or larger than life, no longer the embodiment of evil in the
abstract, but rather embodies those impulses of the human that, though not necessarily evil in
themselves, can lead one to commit evil.” The choice between good and evil is much more difficult
for humans since the fall because of the distance from God. The fall caused a separation from the
knowledge of the perfect will of God and thus it is much harder to keep one’s heart open to the
word of God. Satan fell even harder, and he is, in some ways, unable to receive grace. We feel pity
for a character who is so completely delusional and defeated that he, even after he has been muted,
chooses to keep fighting a losing battle:
Satan stood
A while as mute confounded what to say,
What to reply, confuted and convinced
Of his weak arguing, and fallacious drift;
At length collecting all his serpent wiles,
With soothing words renewed, him thus accosts. (PR, III.1-6)
He has already lost and he knows it, but he still refuses to give up. This only adds to the pity the
reader feels. The distance and isolation is exactly how “we recognize Satan as human because he is
an individual, an entity who is aware of his separation from others” (Rosenfeld 2008, 103). In
addition to this, we feel sorry for Satan who is fighting windmills even though there might be a way
to, at least partial, salvation by repentance and obedience. We are forced to make our own way in
the world. Religion and philosophy have developed for just this reason; we are constantly searching
for guidance: “human beings are creatures created in God’s own image as rational animals. As such,
they seek the good, that is, they seek to realize their potential, to be human in an essential way.
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Unfortunately, each of them is also a child of Adam and his sin. This sin, which damaged (though it
did not destroy) human reason, makes it difficult for humans to find their way” (Gillespie 2006, 32).
This is what makes us human.
This Satan figure suffers pain, both physical and mental; he finds it difficult to maintain
one specific emotion over a given length of time; he is noted for the ability to entertain
opposing emotions simultaneously, both loving and hating the same object at the same
time; his viewpoint is necessarily limited, as he lacks the omniscience of a god. His
understandable confusion as to his – humanity’s – place in the cosmic hierarchy is
productive of sin. (Rosenfeld 2008, 129)
As Kant teaches, all humans do evil at some point. Rosenfeld (2008, 103) reasons that this
impossibility to be perfectly good results from the human tendency to be dynamic in nature. Human
beings are forced to make the choice between moral law and self-love on a daily basis, and no one
can avoid making the wrong choice at least once.
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4 Conclusion
The definition of evil is slippery and difficult to make. If we take the Kantian definition as the basis
we come to the conclusion that every one of us does commit evil acts, but this does not make us
evil. This seems to be hard to accept on an emotional level as applying to everyone; we tend to refer
to Hitler, Charles Manson and Stalin as evil people. Even non-violent criminals, like Bernie Madoff,
are labeled evil. But when it comes to the fact that we all do selfish things which are evil, we are
extremely reluctant to call ourselves evil. So what is the difference? There is none according to
Kant. He (Kant 1996, 189) argues that no man is without a conscience. Even Hitler was human, and
we must treat him as one. “I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a human being” (Kant
1996, 210). We cannot rationally regard some people as monsters according to the degree of evil
they commit. If we did, who would then decide where the line is drawn? If murder is evil, how can
the execution of that evil person be somehow less evil, as he or she is as human as was their victim?
The human tendency to isolate and eradicate unfamiliar entities is not by all means a thing of the
past. Although I have mentioned the Holocaust several times, racism and extremism are in no way
gone from the world. The recent public discussion in Finland has been dominated by people who
claim to be critical of immigration. This has only proven to be a socially acceptable way of
displaying racism. The frightening movement towards isolation and nationalism in politics is not
only found in Finland. The True Finns party is not the only one of its kind in the Nordic countries:
Sweden has also been battling with the growing support of Sweden Democrats and Denmark has
the Danish People’s Party. With the global depression, many countries in the European Union have
been displaying signs of Eurosceptisms. This can only be a result from selfishness and fear of the
unknown. People tend to look back to the good old days when everything was better than it is now,
even though the economies of these countries were not in any way separated from the rest of the
world. We forget too easily what the truth is. The evil known is not in any way better than the evil
unknown. This is why we should be concerned with the study of evil even in the modern rational
times we live in. And we should not be afraid of the conversation about evil, even though there is no
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universally accepted origin for evil or solution for the problem of it. Despite the large variety of
theories available and even though the views on evil differ greatly from each other, they do share
some common ground: “Christian and non-Christian now believe that, even if we do not share a
common belief in God, we can at least agree about actions that are evil” (Hauerwas 2006, 36). The
debate over the problem of evil has helped to reinforce socially acceptable moral code, which is
often enforced with law. If we cannot agree on why evil exists, we can still create a set of moral
values we want to uphold.
Although I have used the Kantian concept of evil here as some sort of a competitor with
Christianity, I want to emphasize that Kant did not try to deny the existence of God, he was merely
trying to offer a philosophical explanation for the problem of evil. And as one notices very early,
there are a lot of similarities; the different theories of evil are mixed together. It does not, then,
come as a surprise that Kant actually used Milton’s works in illustrating his newly formed
philosophical concepts (Budick 2010, 12). Claire Colebrook (2008, 64) has also noticed the
connection, but from another perspective: Milton’s characters willingly (in a very Kantian fashion)
choose evil.
When one applies the Kantian approach to A Masque, it becomes clear that there are other
characters beside Comus, who do evil things in the masque. After a close examination of A Masque
– whatever one’s concept of evil might be – one stumbles on to the fact that the masque is not a
clear instance of the battle between good and evil. It reveals that it is extremely difficult to label
people as either good or evil, but a lot of the actions done are selfish, thus evil: “[n]o being is in
itself evil or marked by evil as a quality, for evil is that capacity for any being to turn away from its
proper potential” (Colebrook 2008, 80). This represents a grim worldview, where all people do evil
things. But, as Danielson (1982, 174-177) argues, we need evil in order for good to appear.
As man, though perfect, Christ’s first intuition was of goodness. One may think that he
did not need to know good through evil; but his mission requires acting in the world,
and evil has helped, or else the drama means nothing. Evil has provided the opportunity,
and the apparatus, for the soul descended into self to define that self in terms of the
world; to recover the common likeness of the soul to the God transcending and uniting
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all souls . . . Satan has got the control of some of the worlds enterprises, but his power is
‘usurped,’ and not complete; nor is the world incorrigibly rotten. Christ is not the first to
refuse the false allurements of Satan (Stein 1965, 130-131).
There is something soothing in this passage after deeming all human beings as the same as Stalin. It
is indeed vital that we see the good as well as the evil in the world or the hope in humanity would
surely be lost. And, as Milton (Areopagitica, 515-516) claims:
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d, that never
sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortall
garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence
into the world, we bring impurity much rather: that which purifies us is triall, and triall
is by what is contrary. That vertue therefore which is but a youngling in the
contemplation of evill, and knows not the utmost that vice promises to her followers,
and rejects it, is but a blank vertue, not a pure; her whitenesse is but an excrementall
whitenesse.
We need our virtue tried, just like Kant suggests (1996, 156), or else it is not really virtue.
The question remains why would Milton go to such lengths to create such villains that make
it easy for the reader to identify with? Is he, as Blake (2001, 1380) suggested “of the Devil’s party
without knowing it?” I agree with Neil Forsyth (2003, 71) on the matter as he suggests that Milton
did not want to make the choice between good and evil as easy as possible for the reader, and thus
created such complex and appealing characters. Be as it may, this thesis has been an excursion to
the battle between good and evil in literature and I have not been making any effort to solve the
problem of evil; as it happens, “the problem of evil remains a challenge that is never completely
overcome” (Ricoeur 1985, 644). I have merely been trying to create a novel approach to Milton’s
works in a more modern way. Without adhering to conventional Christian reading of a 17th Century
writer, we will discover new possibilities in literature studies. Very few ideas are completely
original, the way to progress depends on the ingenuity of application of those ideas.
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